Strangling THE GOOSE WITH THE GOLDEN EGG

Why we need to cut superannuation taxes on Middle Australia

Rebecca Weisser
in collaboration with Henry Ergas

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Note

The author of this research paper acknowledges the very generous contributions of Professor Henry Ergas, Professor Jonathan Pincus, and Brett Hogan. Nevertheless, the author takes full responsibility for the information contained in this research paper. This research paper draws on the submission of the Menzies Research Centre to the National Reform Summit.

Rebecca Weisser
Sydney, 8 September, 2016
Introduction

One wonders whether Phillip Larkin would have shouted ‘Stuff your pension!’, as he famously wished to do in his poem ‘Toad’, had he experienced the twists and turns, the dashed hopes and deceptions, of Australia’s superannuation system. Even he, who despaired of aspirations he saw as profoundly middle class, recognized ‘that’s the stuff dreams are made on’. It’s those dreams of funding a decent retirement—with the cost they impose in terms of submitting to Larkin’s ‘toad’ of daily hard work—that are dashed when governments reneg on promises.

Nowhere are promises more important than in retirement incomes. Saving for retirement involves making sacrifices today for the sake of the distant future; and once retirement occurs, those living on their savings no longer have the cushions—such as choosing to work longer hours—that might help them absorb the income losses governments can so easily inflict. Governments therefore have a duty to provide a stable and predictable framework in which individuals can save for retirement; and the greater the degree to which they can do so encouraging self-reliance, the more they will entrench the sense of independence that is at the heart of human dignity and that underpins a free society.

Australia has long struggled to meet that goal. Having introduced a means-tested age pension relatively early, so providing for some degree of poverty alleviation in old age, we then lagged in developing a comprehensive retirement income system that could ensure reasonable financial security for middle income Australians once they had ended working life. Proposals for a contributory defined-benefit scheme were repeatedly considered and several times advanced; but concerns about their fiscal implications and political divisions prevented their adoption.

Instead, a dual structure was eventually adopted which combined the Age Pension with a defined contribution scheme that had both a compulsory component and allowed for some supplementary contributions.

That choice, which was largely driven by the politics of the moment, was questionable from the outset. Since it came into effect, the problems it creates have only become more acute. As it stands, the scheme shifts complex financial and longevity risk on to savers who are poorly placed to bear it, has stubbornly high transactions costs, and is taxed in such a way as to further stymie its effectiveness.

Adding to the woes, successive governments have fiddled with the scheme’s parameters, almost always with the goal of securing short-term revenue gains. They have, of course, invariably claimed that the latest fiddle would be the last: whether they believed those assurances is questionable; certainly the hapless contributors no longer do.

Unfortunately, the debate about the scheme, and the retirement income system more generally, has not focused on whether it is capable of meeting its objectives despite the damage wreaked on it. Rather, it has been hijacked by claims that the scheme is ‘unfair’, allowing higher income earners to avoid taxes they should have paid. Enveloped in rhetorical claims about ‘rorts’ and the super-rich, the debate has entirely ignored the ‘forgotten people’ - the middle income Australians who neither have incomes so low as to be adequately replaced
by the Age Pension nor are so wealthy as to own large and diversified portfolios of tax-
optimised financial and real assets.

That Labor, with its redistributionist agenda, would pay scant attention to this broad swathe
of the population is perhaps understandable; that the Liberals would do so verges on the
incomprehensible. Yet the most recent round of changes—introduced despite repeated
promises to the contrary—suggests that is exactly what has happened.

To say that is not to deny that the architecture the Coalition’s changes would introduce has a
degree of coherence and is more readily implemented than the options advanced by Labor
and the Greens. But even putting aside the manner in which it was introduced, its design,
when viewed in more detail, seems severely flawed.

For example, the $1.6 million ceiling on the amount that can be held in the untaxed fund of the
withdrawal phase is only indexed to the consumer price index; that means the maximum post-
retirement income it can provide will decline over time compared to pre-retirement incomes,
as wages growth comfortably exceeds the rate of increase in the CPI. To make matters worse,
the Age Pension is indexed—and seems certain to remain that way—to the higher of CPI or
nominal wages growth; as a result, the replacement rate provided by the age pension must
rise compared to that which will be available from the ceilinged amount.

In other words, over time, those on the Age Pension will do steadily better compared to self-
funded retirees. And compounding insult with injury, it is of course those self-funded retirees
who, during the course of their working life, will have paid the taxes that finance the age
pensions they are excluded from enjoying. If our concern is with fairness, that outcome—
which reduces the allowed income replacement level available to those who save for
themselves, relative to that assured to those who live on the income of others—should surely be
objectionable.

However, it is not only fairness that is at stake; it is also efficiency. The economic purpose of
a superannuation system is to facilitate the transfer of consumption from working life to the
post-working years. It serves, in other words, as piggy-bank, allowing what economists call
‘consumption smoothing’ over the life-cycle. Ideally, taxes should be neutral as to when that
consumption occurs: there is no sensible reason for taxing the same amount of consumption
more heavily because it occurs tomorrow rather than today. Achieving that neutrality
requires that the risk-free return on savings (which merely compensates savers for postponing
consumption) be untaxed – so that $1 of consumption today is not taxed differently from
consumption of the same present value at some point in the future.

Our tax system is far from achieving that neutrality, instead taxing the risk-free return to
most forms of savings, excepting the family home, at positive rates, with the fact that those
rates vary as between forms of savings adding to the inefficiency. Moreover, in the case
of superannuation, the effective tax rate on private savings is increased by the (ever more)
aggressive taper on the age pension, which can create effective tax rates on private savings
that are well above the highest rate of personal income tax.

The government’s proposed changes will only aggravate those distortions. Calculating the
precise extent of the impacts—and their distribution among taxpayers—is complicated by the
sheer number of changes and the multiplicity of moving parts, including the interaction with
the Age Pension means test; it is made all the harder by the need to properly take account of
volatility in incomes and of differences in starting point (as most Australians facing retirement
have only had access to superannuation for a couple of decades). However, the Treasury
has invested heavily in developing modelling tools that can do this; assuming it retains its
traditional professionalism, it will undoubtedly have calculated the extent and pattern of the
changes the package causes in effective lifetime tax rates on superannuation.

Transparency would have been well served had the government released those estimates. It
hasn’t, preferring to rely on data which is superficial when it is not seriously misleading.

For example, the government has greatly over-stated the income which can be derived from
the capped $1.6 million by assuming it earns each and every year the rate of return that has
historically characterized relatively risky portfolios, thus treating those returns as if they were
a ‘sure thing’. And as if that were not enough, it then routinely compares the resulting income
stream to the age pension, which is far closer to a ‘sure thing’ then superannuation will ever
be, especially given incessant government attempts at raiding it for revenue. It is easy to
understand why it has chosen to do so, instead of evaluating the income stream from the $1.6
million using the bond rate and taking account of fees, as would be demanded by a like-for-
like comparison: the calculated amount would be far closer to the age pension, undermining
the government’s claim that it is generous.

Ultimately, whatever one might make of the specifics of its plan, the government’s claim is that
an increase in the tax take on superannuation is needed to address the budget deficit. That the
budget deficit has to be tackled is clear; however, even were it to be tackled through higher
taxes, surely it is important to ensure that the taxes that are increased are those which impose
the lowest economic costs. It hardly needs to be said that increasing taxes on savings, which
are already taxed inefficiently heavily, does not meet that criterion.

Rather, the reason the government proposes to increase those taxes is because it can: they
mainly hit middle-class and better-off Australians, and so are enthusiastically endorsed by the
industry superannuation funds, the welfare lobby, and most of all, the ALP and the Greens,
along with their noisy chorus of fellow-travelling think tanks. In contrast, durably changing the
dynamics of public spending would require real political courage and ability; so too would
serious tax reform.

But there is a price to be paid for taking the path of least political resistance. As Schumpeter
put it, a country’s fiscal structure is the best indicator of its real constitution—who has power
and who doesn’t, which citizens are genuinely important and which are confined to second
class. Seen in that light, the lesson of these changes is that Australia’s ‘forgotten people’ are
as forgotten as they have ever been: their values, including that of self-reliance, derided;
the confidence they have historically placed on the Liberal Party’s sincerity and good faith
mocked.

The long term damage to Australia’s social fabric—the fabric the Menzies and Howard
governments did so much to create—remains to be seen. But the damage to the Liberal Party’s
reputation, most notably among its historic constituency, has been as immediate as it risks
proving enduring.

Combining analysis and passion, Rebecca Weisser brings these issues and many others to the
forefront. Superannuation is a minefield of technical complexities; there will always be scope
to argue about precisely what they imply. But ignoring the branches through an obsessive
focus on the twigs is merely a way of avoiding the questions that really matter. The great virtue
of this paper, which deserves a wide audience, is that it tackles those questions head on,
putting into sharp focus the increased dangers our already flawed retirement incomes system now faces. Rather than kow-towing to the self-images of the day, it pierces through the rhetoric of ‘fairness talk’; most importantly, it adopts the perspective, and champions the cause, of that middle class whose strength has always been the bedrock not only of this country’s prosperity but also of its freedom.

Over a 1000 years ago, the great Muslim merchant and traveller, Akhbar al-Shin wal Hind, was amazed to find in Canton a system where all men paid a poll tax from when they turned 18. In return, he was told by high authorities:

“… when he reaches 80 years of age, no poll-tax is collected from him. He is then paid a pension from the Treasury. They say, ‘We took from him when he was a youth, and we pay him a salary when he is old’.”

Middle Australia, as it digests this latest blow to our system’s credibility, can only share Akbar’s wonder at what he rightly regarded as the surest sign of a civilized society.

Professor Henry Ergas
Almost a quarter of a century after the introduction of compulsory superannuation, four out of five Australians face not having enough savings to fully fund their retirement.

Yet rather than identify new ways to encourage people to put more money into their retirement accounts, the bipartisan approach of national policy makers is to treat this $2 trillion worth of private funds as just another source of taxation revenue.

In *Strangling the Goose with the Golden Egg*, Rebecca Weisser and Henry Ergas powerfully capture how this short term desire for revenue puts Australia at a disadvantage, and how the changes proposed by both the Government and the Opposition will make it unlikely that middle income earners will ever be free of the Age Pension.

High transaction costs, a lack of individual control, and rules that continually change are also contributing to a lack of trust and confidence in the current system.

But there is a better way.

Instead of citing ‘fairness’ to criticise people who attempt to provide for themselves, policy makers should acknowledge that private funds put aside for retirement represent deferred consumption, so flat and low superannuation takes on contributions and earnings for everyone is actually good public policy.

Instead of proposing that the goal of the superannuation system is merely to ‘substitute or supplement the Age Pension’ the aim should be to ensure as many Australians as possible take personal responsibility to save for their own retirement.

Instead of making the rules of the system ever more complex, simplicity and neutrality should be guiding principles.

Rebecca and Henry propose moving towards an ‘EET system’ where instead of taxing contributions and earnings, only end-benefits in retirement are taxed at an individual’s marginal income tax rate. They also suggest prioritizing the reduction of fees and charges and facilitating the purchase of private, defined-benefit pensions.

Superannuation lies at the heart of important national policy questions about taxes, spending, personal responsibility and the role of government. The Institute of Public Affairs will continue to conduct and support quality research on these topics.

**Brett Hogan**

Director of Research
Institute of Public Affairs
3 Executive summary

The purpose of the retirement income system should be to enable Australians to maintain in retirement the living standards they achieve during their working lives.

While our system largely achieves that goal for low and high-income earners, middle-income Australia is poorly served.

High effective tax rates on superannuation are a critical factor contributing to a retirement savings deficit for middle-income Australians, increasing their reliance on the age pension.

Moreover, the current system imposes unacceptably high transactions costs and risk on middle-income Australians.

Unfortunately, proposed changes to superannuation from both the Government and the Opposition worsen, rather than fix the system’s myriad weaknesses.

Superannuation reforms should be judged by the effect that they have on helping each individual to accumulate sufficient funds to maintain their living standards in retirement.

The Government should:

- ensure that the Objective of the superannuation system is to allow people to maintain their living standards in retirement;

- task the Productivity Commission to review the whole retirement income system, considering the interaction of the age pension, superannuation and the taxation of savings;

- phase in a return to an EET system over time, where taxes are levied on benefits in retirement, not contributions or earnings,

- put out a tender for a low-fee default superannuation scheme and allow people to switch to it when they submit their tax return.

- facilitate the provision of defined benefit pensions to those who wish to purchase them.

If however the Government continues with its current policy approach, then it should allow income generated from assets outside superannuation to count as part of the $1.6 million asset base for tax-free retirement income and also allow the carry forward of unused concessional caps from 2007.
The architecture of Australia’s retirement savings system

4.1 How the system evolved

National retirement systems are often classified according to a framework of pillars established by the World Bank. While variously categorized, three elements are commonly identified as pillars. The first pillar is a pension, funded from general taxes, which alleviates poverty and is either universal or means-tested. The second pillar mandates contributions to defined benefit or defined contribution schemes and aims to replace working income. The third pillar consists of tax arrangements that encourage voluntary contributions to defined benefit or defined contribution schemes.¹

For most of the 20th century, Australia’s retirement income system had two of these pillars and a third critical element. The first pillar was the Age Pension, which was introduced in 1909 and intended to alleviate poverty and therefore subject to an income and asset test. The second pillar was voluntary superannuation in which an employer made regular payments on behalf of an employee toward a future pension. These arrangements dated back to schemes offered by banks and state governments in the 19th century. From 1914, employer contributions and investment earnings were taxed differently to income tax and in 1936, different tax arrangements were put in place for benefits taken as a lump sum, introducing the EET system of taxation of superannuation². A third critical element to the retirement system was the exemption from taxation of the family home, which was introduced in 1912 and remains central to the retirement strategies of the majority of Australians.

All these arrangements remained largely unchanged for around half a century ³ but the missing element was - and still is - a compulsory, contributory, earnings-related public pension, which would provide a defined benefit pension in retirement.

It is one of the great ironies of Australian public policy that between 1913 and 1938 two unsuccessful attempts were made by centre-right governments⁴ to introduce just such a European-style, compulsory, contributory, earnings-related public pension and were blocked by the Labor Party, amongst others, which opposed it because it wanted, instead, to strengthen the Age Pension⁵.

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¹ World Bank, Averting the old-age crisis: policies to protect the old and promote growth, (World Bank, Washington, DC, 1994), p.15
² Superannuation can be taxed at three points: on contributions, on investment income, and when benefits are drawn down in retirement. Whether taxation occurs at each of these points and whether it is at full or concessional rates is indicated using the symbols: E – exempt from tax, T – taxed at full rates, and t – taxed at concessional rates. An EET system exempts contributions and investment earnings but taxes final benefits. There are many permutations i.e. TEE, TET, TtE, ttE, TtEt etc...
Then, when the centre-right had given up, the Labor Party, together with the trade union movement, introduced a privately managed retirement scheme based on individual accounts, which incidentally, through the control of superannuation funds, offered a lucrative way of boosting the economic and therefore political power of the union movement, which was suffering a rapid decline in membership. As a result, productivity award superannuation was introduced in 1986 and compulsory superannuation was introduced in 1992.

4.2 The system today

This has given Australia the broad architecture of the retirement system that it has today, which uses of all three of the World Bank’s pillars.

The most substantial is the means-tested Age Pension, which has evolved from bare poverty alleviation to providing a quarter of average, male weekly earnings.

The second pillar is compulsory saving through private superannuation accounts, comprising employer contributions which are tax deductible, employee contributions which are not tax deductible but receive different tax treatments, fund earnings which are taxed differently, and benefits which are not currently taxed in recognition of the taxes that have already been paid and the bias against saving in the Australian taxation system.

The third pillar is the different taxation of voluntary saving through superannuation and other forms of long-term saving through property and shares, which are also central to an effective retirement system.

In addition, the family home operates as a de facto fourth pillar since it is the single largest asset for most Australians and serves as the centrepiece of their retirement strategy. Paying off the family home is a tax effective way of reducing retirement expenses by obviating the need to pay rent or a mortgage. As well as reducing income needs in retirement, it also serves as a means of transferring consumption from working life to the retirement years, as home equity is a store of wealth that can be accessed through reverse mortgages or downsizing. Estimates show that without this ‘fourth leg,’ income replacement rates for those on middle-incomes would be very low for many years.

6 Union membership fell from 60 per cent of the workforce in the 1960s to 45 percent in the 1980s, and then to 17 percent (12 in the private sector) today. See Adam Creighton, ‘We are all capitalists now’, Only in Australia – the History, Politics, and Economic of Australian Exceptionalism, edited by William O. Coleman, Oxford University Press, 2016, p.194.

Problems with Australia’s Retirement Savings System

5.1 Goal of superannuation to maintain income standards in retirement

Like most advanced economies, the Australian retirement system faces a major demographic challenge.

In 1901, 4 per cent of Australians were 65 years or older. Now, more than 13 per cent are 65 or older and by 2041 nearly a quarter of Australians (23 per cent) are expected to be 65 or older. A boy born today can expect to live to 92 and a girl to 94. Australians therefore face the challenge of financing what may be 30 or more years of living expenses beyond the normal end of working life. Longer life expectancies, better health and higher levels of education should postpone retirement. Indeed, the labour force participation rate of people 65 and older has already nearly doubled, from 6 per cent in 2004-05 to around 12 per cent today.

However, while Treasury expects half the men aged 65 to 70, and 35 per cent of women, to still be in the labour force in 2055, the proportion of over-70s working is unlikely to rise much above 10 per cent, so that virtually all of the ‘older old’ will have little or no employment income and will have to rely on pensions and accumulated savings.

The introduction of compulsory superannuation was meant to respond to that demographic challenge by making it mandatory for all working Australians to put aside sufficient funds to be able to support themselves comfortably in retirement.

In 2007 former Prime Minister Paul Keating, the architect of compulsory superannuation, said the goal of superannuation was to allow employees ‘to enjoy in retirement an income equal to 70 per cent of their earnings before retirement.’ That is an admirably clear and worthy goal yet almost a quarter of a century later, it is only those on the lowest pre-retirement incomes who are able to enjoy an income in retirement equal to 70 per cent of their pre-retirement earnings, let alone the 80 per cent or more achieved in many OECD countries (Figure 1).

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10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

Figure 1: Net Pension Replacement Rates by Earnings. Source: OECD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD members</th>
<th>Individual earnings, multiple of mean for men (women where different)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pension Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Slovak Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.65 (0.64)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD34</td>
<td>0.65.5 (65.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other major economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Individual earnings, multiple of mean for men (women where different)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0.65 (60)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.55 (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.60 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>0.60 (55)</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU28</td>
<td>0.65.2 (65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A retirement income stream that replaces 80 per cent of a person’s working income is broadly considered sufficient to maintain real living standards, given that expenditure needs fall with age (for instance, older people are more likely to have paid off a mortgage and no longer have dependent children).

The measurement of retirement income as a proportion of working income is called the replacement rate and can be calculated using a range of methodologies. Broadly, net retirement income is divided by net final pre-retirement income to calculate the net replacement rate. The OECD gathers information about mandatory and voluntary private and public pension schemes and the taxation treatment of workers and pensioners and uses this to calculate the net replacement rate.

5.2 Low-income earners achieve high replacement rates

OECD data shows that contrary to the view that the Australian retirement system favours the rich, net replacement rates secured through the pension and superannuation system are high only for people on low incomes and are lower than the OECD average for people on average and above average incomes.

Additionally, although Australians have relatively high rates of home ownership, and imputed income from housing means actual consumption replacement rates are somewhat higher than OECD estimates suggest, home ownership is very widely distributed, so imputed housing income does not greatly alter the replacement rate relativities between middle and lower income groups.

The Age Pension however is not particularly generous and low income earners achieve a high replacement rate, above 88.6 per cent, in part because some welfare recipients improve their living standards when they move from other welfare benefits to the Age Pension. The OECD estimates that the incomes of people 65 and older in the advanced economies are, on average, 14 per cent below those of their respective populations; however, older Australians have average incomes 35 per cent lower than the Australian population as a whole. Adding the benefit of home-ownership doesn’t close the income gap but does halve it.

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17 The single pension rate is $794.80 whereas the single rate for unemployment benefit for a person aged over 60 is $570.80 after 9 continuous months of unemployment. The single rate for a person on a disability pension is identical to the rate of the pension, so moving to the Age Pension represents a continuation of the same standard of living for the disabled but an improvement for the long-term unemployed.


19 Ibid.
Yet, even taking account of taxes, transfers and household size, 80 per cent of older couples are in the bottom two income quintiles\textsuperscript{20}. That low-income earners rely on the pension is neither surprising nor unreasonable. The consumption sacrifice they would have to make during their working life makes it difficult if not impossible to accumulate savings. Further, the cost of managing small savings in a private savings scheme would take such a large share of annual earnings that it would also prevent accumulation.

5.3 High income earners fund their retirement despite high taxes

At the other end of the income spectrum, high-income earners (defined for OECD purposes as those earning one and a half times average earnings) have a low replacement rate of 45.9 per cent\textsuperscript{21} in terms of income provided by the pension and superannuation, so the system delivers less for them in terms of replacement rates than for low income earners. Yet very high income earners are likely to have incomes in retirement from sources not covered by the OECD estimates, and a greater capacity to manage their resources to fund their retirement as they can accumulate large and diversified portfolios of financial and real assets.

But Australia’s high income earners do this after paying an effective average tax rate on top income earners that is three percentage points higher than that in Canada, five percentage points higher than that in Sweden and 10 percentage points higher than that in the US\textsuperscript{22}.

Our highly progressive tax and transfer system also ensures that the poorest 20 percent of Australians get more than 40 percent of income transfers and 12 times more in cash benefits than the richest 20 percent which get less than 3 percent, by far the highest ratio in the advanced economies\textsuperscript{23}.

5.4 Stuck in the Middle - average Australians’ sharp drop in retirement incomes

It is middle-income earners in Australia, on replacement rates of 58 per cent, that have a problem. The system compresses the distribution of income among older Australians to the disadvantage of middle-income earners who experience a sharp drop in their absolute and relative position in society.

In 2011-12, for instance, a typical middle-income couple aged 45 to 64 had almost twice the income of a couple of similar age in the two lowest income deciles whereas for those aged 65 and over, a middle income couple was only 25 per cent better off than its poorer counterparts\textsuperscript{24}.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid
And despite earning relatively high wages and making compulsory savings throughout their working lives, they achieve significantly lower replacement rates than do their counterparts in many other countries in the OECD and lower than the OECD average. While average yearly worker earnings are higher in Australia than the OECD average ($79,689 compared with $48,901), the net replacement rates for average workers in Australia (58 per cent for men and 53.4 per cent for women) is lower than the OECD average (63.2 per cent) and much lower than the EU28 average (70.9 per cent) (See Figure 2 and Figure 3).

Figure 2 Australia’s below average replacement rates for average earners. Source: OECD

Net pension replacement rates: Average earners

26 Ibid p. 210
27 Ibid p. 145
28 Ibid p. 145
Figure 3 Australia’s above average replacement rates for low earners but not high earners. Source: OECD\textsuperscript{29}

Net pension replacement rates: Low and high earners

The OECD average for the net replacement rates of an average earner, including mandatory and voluntary public and private schemes, is higher still at 71 percent\textsuperscript{30}.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid p. 145
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid p. 146
The situation is even less positive when one compares the average Australian retiree with those OECD countries with the highest net pension replacement rates for people on average incomes such as:

- Austria  91.6
- Hungary  89.6
- Iceland  76.7
- Italy  79.7
- Luxembourg  88.6
- Netherlands  95.7
- Portugal  89.5
- Slovak Republic  80.6
- Spain  89.5
- Turkey  104.8

Some of these countries deliver high replacement rates for all income groups, allowing people across the income spectrum to maintain the income levels they achieved pre-retirement. For instance, in Austria net replacement rates are 92.1 per cent for low-income earners, 91.6 percent for average income earners and 88.9 percent for above average income earners. In Spain, replacement rates are almost identical for low, average and above average income earners at 89 percent[31].

Looking ahead to 2061, the OECD projects that net replacement rates will continue to be skewed in favour of low-income earners, based on projections which model scenarios using current legislation and 2014 data.

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**Figure 4 OECD pension modelling results – Baseline scenario. Source: OECD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual earnings, multiple of average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (where different)</td>
<td>0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross relative pension level</td>
<td>39.6 42.1 44.5 49.3 61.9 74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% average gross earnings)</td>
<td>379 39.4 40.9 43.9 54.7 65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net relative pension level</td>
<td>51.8 54.9 58 64.3 80.7 97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% net average earnings)</td>
<td>49.4 51.4 53.4 57.3 71.4 86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross replacement rate</td>
<td>79.3 56.1 44.5 32.9 30.9 24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% individual gross earnings)</td>
<td>75.7 52.5 40.9 29.3 27.3 22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net replacement rate</td>
<td>88.6 69.6 58 45.9 44.8 38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% individual net earnings)</td>
<td>84.6 65.1 53.4 40.9 39.6 34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross pension wealth</td>
<td>14.0 9.9 7.8 5.8 5.5 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(multiple of individual gross earnings)</td>
<td>15.1 10.5 8.2 5.8 5.5 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net pension wealth</td>
<td>14.0 9.9 7.8 5.8 5.5 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(multiple of individual gross earnings)</td>
<td>15.1 10.5 8.2 5.8 5.5 4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Assumptions: Real rate of return 3%, real earnings growth 1.25%, inflation 2%, and real discount rate 2%. All systems are modelled and indexed according to what is legislated. Transitional rules apply where relevant. DC conversion rate equal 85%. Labour market entry occurs at age 20 in 2014. Tax system latest available: 2013.*

**Figure 5 OECD pension modelling results – Alternative Scenario. Source: OECD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual earnings, multiple of average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (where different)</td>
<td>0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross relative pension level</td>
<td>41.5 43.9 46.3 51.2 61.9 74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% average gross earnings)</td>
<td>41.5 43.9 46.3 51.2 61.9 74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net relative pension level</td>
<td>54.2 57.3 60.5 66.8 80.7 97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% net average earnings)</td>
<td>54.2 57.3 60.5 66.8 80.7 97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross replacement rate</td>
<td>83.0 58.6 46.3 34.1 30.9 24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% individual gross earnings)</td>
<td>83.0 58.6 46.3 34.1 30.9 24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net replacement rate</td>
<td>92.8 72.7 60.5 47.7 44.8 38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% individual net earnings)</td>
<td>92.8 72.7 60.5 47.7 44.8 38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross pension wealth</td>
<td>14.7 10.3 8.2 6.0 5.5 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(multiple of individual gross earnings)</td>
<td>15.9 11.0 8.5 6.1 5.5 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net pension wealth</td>
<td>14.7 10.3 8.2 6.0 5.5 4.4</td>
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</table>

*Assumptions: Real rate of return 3%, real earnings growth 1.25%, inflation 2%, and real discount rate 2%. All systems are modelled and indexed according to what is legislated. Transitional rules apply where relevant. DC conversion rate equal 85%. Labour market entry occurs at age 20 in 2014. Tax system latest available: 2013.*

33 Ibid, p. 211.
That is not to say government should guarantee high replacement rates at any cost. There is no doubt that many countries have pursued the goal of pension adequacy in ways that are fiscally irresponsible, though there are also those where that objective has been achieved without compromising long term fiscal sustainability. For example, Defined Benefit Pension Funds in Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway Portugal and Spain had an average funding ratio around or above 110 percent in 2013, the most recent year for which figures are available\(^\text{34}\).

So despite the fact that Australians have been forced to save ever more of their income in superannuation, starting at 3 per cent in 1992 and rising to 9.5 per cent today, 80 percent of Australians still rely to a greater or lesser extent on the age pension, funded out of general revenue (Figure 6).\(^\text{35}\)

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\(^\text{34}\) Ibid, p.197

\(^\text{35}\) The National Commission of Audit wrote ‘on current projections there is unlikely to be an increase in the proportion of individuals who are completely self-sufficient and not reliant on the Age Pension despite the significant investment in superannuation over time. Even allowing for a decline in the proportion of people receiving the full pension, a rise in the number of people receiving the part-rate of pension will see the proportion of older Australians eligible for the Age Pension remaining constant at 80 per cent over the next forty years or so.’ Source: National Commission Audit, 7.1 Age Pension, http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/phase-one/part-b/7-1-age-pension.html

\(^\text{36}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{37}\) Ibid.
Indeed, Treasury modelling in 2009, cited in the Harmer Report, noted that the maturing of the Superannuation Guarantee in 2042 was only estimated to reduce the total value of pension spending by some 6 percent.\(^\text{38}\)

This is hardly a satisfactory outcome. It seems even more curious when one considers that average earnings in Australia are high by international standards, which should allow reasonable levels of savings.

All other things being equal, Australians on average incomes should be able to look forward to maintaining the same consumption income they achieved in their working lives during their retirement. Yet for the majority this goal is elusive and the reality is that their living standards decline.

### 5.5 Shortsighted taxes, long-term damage

Former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s ex post-facto explanation for this retirement savings deficit is to blame his opponents for not increasing compulsory contributions to 15 per cent of wages.\(^\text{39}\)

But increasing mandated contributions has a steep economic cost, as it can force employees and their families to reduce consumption at times when doing so imposes a substantial sacrifice. Even putting that aside, his criticism ignores the impact that the Hawke Labor Government’s restructure of superannuation taxation arrangements in 1988 had on savings in superannuation funds. Facing a shortfall in revenue in 1988, the government imposed a tax of 15 per cent on contributions and earnings but reduced taxes on benefits to zero for lump sums up to a certain moderate amount.\(^\text{40}\) This represented a dramatic departure from the status quo ante as until then, an employer’s contributions to superannuation were tax deductible, earnings were exempted from taxation and benefits were taxed at an individual’s marginal income tax rate.\(^\text{41}\)

This previous approach is broadly the approach followed in most OECD countries and confers a number of important benefits. First, it maximizes an individual’s accumulation of savings and taxes income only when it is consumed. As well as being more equitable in terms of taxing like incomes alike, it ensures that the risk associated with generating a retirement income is spread between the individual and the government rather than being borne solely by the individual. Second, by taxing retirement income as ordinary income it provides an incentive to smooth consumption out over the anticipated retirement period since the larger the withdrawal the higher the marginal tax rate that would be paid. Third, it maintains the breadth of the income tax base regardless of changes in the demographic profile of a country.


\(^{40}\) Adam Creighton, “We are all capitalists now”, Only in Australia – the History, Politics, and Economic of Australian Exceptionalism, ed. William O. Coleman, Oxford University Press, 2016, p.197.

The taxation of superannuation in Australia is very complex, particularly considered over time, but broadly speaking Labor’s restructure under the Hawke and Keating governments brought forward the receipt of tax revenue, transforming the taxation of superannuation in Australia from an EET system to a TTE system. Australia is one of the few advanced economies to tax retirement incomes in this way. Almost all other OECD countries use the EET system, including most of the countries that outperform Australia on retirement replacement rates for average income earners. Countries that achieve high retirement incomes and use the EET system include Canada, Chile, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.

Paul Keating’s decision to adopt an approach that increased immediate taxation on superannuation was shortsighted and dramatically reduced retirement savings, particularly for middle-income earners. It should be a lesson to those who want to further increase taxes on retirement savings today. Australians are compelled to use superannuation to save for their retirement, yet from the outset, taxation has threatened to strangle the goose that should lay the golden nest egg.

42 See Footnote 2
5.6 Correctly estimating the value of the age pension

Middle-income earners receive much less government support than those on low-incomes (Figure 7) and although their savings rise, the average superannuation balance for a 60 year old in 2017-18 is estimated to be $240,000, with women’s balances less than half those of the average man.

This is not sufficient to maintain living standards or indeed to achieve the replacement rates of low income earners who rely on taxpayers to fund their retirement.

Figure 7 Reduction in direct assistance for middle-income earners

Age Pension under new Asset Test

It hardly seems fair that those who work and save for retirement should be relatively less well-off than those who save nothing for their retirement but Figure 7, which values the Age Pension at around $500,000 in life-time payments in today’s dollars, can be misleading as it doesn’t indicate how much it costs a self-funded retiree to safely and reliably generate the same income.

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44 Mercer Australia, AIST Mercer Super Tracker – How the super system stacks up on fairness, adequacy, and sustainability, March 2016, p.7
45 The Hon Scott Morrison MP Treasurer, The Hon Kelly O’Dwyer MP Minister for Revenue and Financial Services, ‘A More Sustainable Superannuation System,’ Budget 2016 Briefing Note, p. 5
As Jeremy Cooper, Chair of the Review into the Governance, Efficiency, Structure and Operation of Australia’s Superannuation System and chairman of retirement income at Challenger Sydney wrote in April, 2015:

“The brutal reality is a fair price for an age pension in today’s interest rate environment is about $1 million. For that amount, a couple will get $1,297 a fortnight, or $33,717 of income a year. That’s right; the full age pension (including supplements) would cost a 65-year-old couple a surprising $1,022,000 to buy today. For a 65-year old single woman, an age pension-equivalent income stream of $860 a fortnight for life, including supplements, or $22,365 a year, would cost $666,000.”

To calculate the value of future Age Pension cash flows one has to ‘discount’ them to today’s dollars. Given the Age Pension is guaranteed by the government, the appropriate discount rate is the 10-year government bond rate of 2.30 per cent, the closest thing to a long-term, risk-free rate in Australia.

Those who think a couple will need less than $1,022,000 to retire on to generate the Age Pension, are assuming either a higher 10-year bond rate, and/or higher returns from investing in riskier asset classes. But riskier asset classes cannot safely and reliably generate an income stream. Of course bond rates have been higher in the past. For instance, a bond rate of 6 per cent was around the average for the two decades to December 2013. At that rate, the capital value of the age pension would be around $410,000 for a single person. Unfortunately, 10-year bond rates indicate that higher returns are unlikely this decade.

So a couple with their own home and no savings are entitled to an Age Pension which is the equivalent of a fully indexed defined benefit pension for life that could be purchased for $1,022,000; a couple with their own home and $814,250 in assets are ineligible for the pension and therefore seemingly worse off. Of course, after running down their assets, they will eventually qualify for the part pension and for the full pension but the example illustrates the bias against saving and the complex and contradictory incentives and disincentives that make it difficult to plan for retirement securely, efficiently and effectively.

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid
51 Ibid
52 The pension for a single person including the pension supplement and the energy supplement is worth $867.00 per fortnight or $22,542 a year. The combined pension for a couple (including both supplements) is worth $1,307 per fortnight or $33,982.
53 A 65-year old man will, on average, live to 83.7 and a 65-year old woman will live to 86.8.
5.7 Correcting for the bias against saving

The taxation treatment of superannuation savings is frequently spoken of as if it were a generous, or indeed an overly generous handout from the government, and the equivalent of a taxpayer-funded pension. In reality its purpose is to address the ‘bias in the current taxation system against long-term saving, particularly lifetime saving such as superannuation.’

The bias discourages saving in a number of ways.

First, Australia’s highly progressive taxes on income reduce the disposable income that people have to save.

Second, the Australian taxation system treats the earnings generated by savings as income and taxes it at an individual’s marginal rate. This disadvantages savers in a number of ways compared with those who consume their earnings immediately:

- savers face additional taxes, every year, on their nominal earnings, even though these earnings must cover inflation simply to retain their present value;
- the tax on the earnings of capital at the individual’s marginal tax rate reduces those earnings by more than the progressive taxation of wages since only a portion of a wage is taxed at the marginal tax rate; and
- the longer the savings are held the more they are eroded by annual taxes on earnings and inflation, creating a wedge between pre- and post-tax earnings which compounds over time.

It is in recognition of this punitive taxation of saving that most governments don’t tax saving in the same way as income that is earned and immediately consumed and particularly long-held savings that are intended to provide income in retirement.

It is also why most governments run income-related pension schemes that are almost always sheltered from taxes and provides the rationale for not taxing capital gains in the same way as wages. The means-tested pension and other means-tested benefits also represent further effective income taxation in retirement and a disincentive to save.

Correctly costing the tax treatment of superannuation

The equity and fairness of the tax treatment of superannuation is also contested, because it is said to cost taxpayers more than the pension. In fact, it doesn’t.

In 2015-16 assistance to the aged was estimated by Treasury at $60.734 billion. In its Tax Expenditure Statement for 2015, issued on January 29, Treasury estimated the value of superannuation concessions at $30.610 billion comprising $810 million for concessions on personal contributions, $16.250 billion for concessions on employer contributions and $13.550 billion for concessions on earnings in funds.

But even this overstates the cost because of the way in which the value of the tax treatment of superannuation is estimated. That estimate is based on comparing the tax rate on superannuation to the income tax savers would pay were the superannuation contributions of employers and employees made from after-tax income which was taxed at their marginal income tax rates and if the earnings in funds were also taxed at the individual’s marginal rate. This is known as a comprehensive income benchmark.

But no advanced country taxes long held retirement savings at standard income tax rates because it would result incripplingly high effective tax rates. For example, for an Australian taxpayer facing a 45 percent marginal rate, applying standard income tax rates to retirement savings would lead to a situation in which each $1 of retirement consumption would cost savers nearly $5 in taxes over a lifetime of saving, implying a consumption tax rate of a staggering 465 per cent.

If those tax rates were imposed, voluntary superannuation savings would plummet, so the revenue raised by the government would fall far short of the amount reported by Treasury. And the consequences for the living standards of retirees would be so dire that the system would be politically unsustainable. Punitive taxes on savings also impose a substantial cost in terms of economic efficiency, as they distort patterns of consumption over time.

The tax treatment of superannuation must further the system’s purpose which is to facilitate the efficient transfer of consumption from working life, when employment and other income is earned, to retirement, when the opportunity to work is materially reduced.

Since the purpose of retirement savings is to fund future consumption, tax rates on savings should
be measured in terms of their impact on the cost to savers of shifting consumption from their working life to retirement. This is all the more the case as savers are required to lock their savings away for up to 47 years (assuming they start working at 20 and retire at 67), with a substantial share of those savings being compulsory.

The tax treatment of superannuation should therefore be assessed using a consumption or expenditure tax benchmark, which measures the tax rate on consuming in the future as compared to consuming today. Using such a benchmark, tax rates in Australia on long held superannuation are already high.

5.9 Correctly costing the means-tested pension

Treasury’s estimates of the implied tax rates on superannuation also take no account of the pension and aged care means tests. So although in the current system superannuation is notionally untaxed in the drawdown retirement phase, in reality, retirement income is taxed as it leads to benefits or transfers being reduced or withheld altogether.

These ‘claw-backs’ or taper effects, which are ignored in Treasury’s modeling, imply that even on a comprehensive income benchmark, effective tax rates on long held superannuation are probably above current income tax rates, particularly for middle income earners.

Worse, the government’s reduction of eligibility for the pension, effective from January 2017, will further hit middle Australia hardest (since those at the bottom of the income scales will still qualify while those at the top would not have qualified in any event).

Instead of losing $1.50 of Age Pension for each $1,000 over the full Age Pension asset threshold, retirees will lose $3.00 of Age Pension for each $1,000 over the threshold. As many as 300,000 retirees are expected to lose some or all of their pension entitlements although they will retain the Commonwealth Seniors Health Card, and the assets-test free threshold will increase from $202,000 to $250,000.60

The result will be a substantial increase in the effective tax rate on private retirement savings. The Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees (AIST) and Mercer estimate that under the new Age Pension Assets Test, effective tax rates for retirees on part pensions could rise by up to 40 percent, due to reductions in Age Pension payments. 61

Figure 8 shows how sharply the position of middle-income earners will deteriorate under the new provisions.

Yet high income tax and high taxes on investment earnings in superannuation don’t leave middle-income earners with enough to maintain their living standards in retirement. As Professor Jonathan Pincus put it at a recent Roundtable on Retirement Incomes, since 1992 Australia has been forcing current taxpayers to finance their own retirement as well as that of the previous generation. Traditionally in Australia each generation financed the pensions of the previous generation and had their public pensions paid by the succeeding generation. Since 1992 however workers have not only funded the Aged Pension of those who are currently eligible but funded the reduction in their own future eligibility for the Aged Pension, through the Superannuation Guarantee Levy.

Reduced access to the pension should be prospective and accompanied by reduced taxes on superannuation savings so that middle and upper income earners can boost saving. Without the possibility of increasing savings or income, these measures will create strong incentives for retirees to restructure their assets so that they can still access the pension. The measures are therefore unlikely to raise the revenue anticipated.

62 Ibid.
63 Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia/Committee for Sustainable Retirement Incomes ASSA/CSRI Roundtable on Retirement Income Adequacy and Interactions with Aged Care and Health Care, Canberra, Wednesday 6 April 2016
5.10 Flat taxes on contributions – heart break for whom?

Another alleged inequity of the system is that superannuation contributions are taxed at a flat rate of 15 cents per dollar contributed so that that low-income earners pay relatively more tax when a dollar of their earnings goes in to superannuation rather than when they receive wages (since they pay little or no tax on their income), whereas middle and high-income earners get bigger marginal tax benefits from measures to combat the bias against saving (because they save more and because they pay more tax).

Deloitte calls this the ‘Heartbreak Hill,’ though this analysis takes no account of the benefit that low-income earners receive from the Age Pension. When the Age Pension is added into the equation it is middle-income earners who are left in ‘Heartbreak Hollow’ (see Figure 8) unable to achieve the income replacement rates in retirement of low-income earners.

Figure 9 Deloitte’s ‘Heartbreak Hill’ looks at the tax treatment of superannuation but ignores the Age Pension
Source: Deloitte

5.11 How does our tax treatment of superannuation compare globally?

In February 2013, global human resources company Mercer benchmarked the Australian superannuation system against the taxation treatment of retirement savings in eight developed countries considered to have world-class retirement savings systems – Canada, Chile, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.

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Mercer’s study did not consider the effective tax rate implied by withdrawal of the pension and other benefits, but even without that, the study showed that in six of these eight countries the tax regimes were less punitive towards retirement savings than in Australia.

In particular, Mercer found that Australia’s concessional contribution caps fell significantly short of all other countries. Mercer measured the caps as a percentage of average earnings. Whereas Australia’s cap was 34.6 percent of average earnings, the UK cap was 127 percent, Switzerland was 255 percent and there was no limit for Denmark.

Australia’s parsimonious caps are even more problematic given that, unlike some of the other countries, Australia’s Age Pension is means-tested and thus privately-funded savings are even more important. When Mercer wrote the report in February 2013, the cap was $25,000. It rose to $35,000 for those over 50 in July 2014 under measures introduced by the Gillard government.66 This threshold was not indexed and was intended to expire when the indexed cap of $25,000 for those under 50 reached $35,000.

Instead, three years later, the Coalition government is proposing to reduce the cap back to $25,000 for everyone, which means that Australia’s concessional caps fall even further short than those of the comparator countries in 2016 than they did in 2013. In addition, Australia was the only country that taxed employer contributions (paid by the fund). Australia was also the only country that taxed investment income that didn’t also have either a universal pension or an earnings-related publicly supported scheme.

In view of this Mercer wrote that on the global stage, the taxation of Australia’s retirement savings was not overly generous. The report noted that Australia had below average results for both the average and the above-average income earner. It concluded that the results of the benchmarking raised the question as to whether the arrangements provided Australians with the best opportunity to save for a comfortable retirement, while also reducing future reliance on the Government. Three years later, the government has reduced access to the pension for middle-income Australians and is proposing to make it even harder for them to save for their retirement.

5.12 Australia more redistributive than Sweden

Proposals to increase taxes on superannuation savings are justified by the supposed ‘unfairness’ of the system, which allegedly provides too many benefits to the well-off at the expense of the taxpayer and of the poor.

66 On 5 April 2013, then Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation Hon. Bill Shorten MP announced that the government would increase the cap for concessional contributions from $25,000 to $35,000 cap for anyone over 50 because older people had not had the benefit of the Superannuation Guarantee for their entire working lives and should be given a chance to increase contributions as they approached retirement. Source: Hon. Bill Shorten MP Joint Media Release with Treasurer Hon. Wayne Swan MP, 5 April 2013, http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2013/020.htm&pageID=&min=brs&Year=&DocType=0 Viewed 6 September 2016
In reality, the Australian tax and transfer system is highly redistributive. The share of taxes paid by individuals in the lowest quintile – the poor – is lower in Australia than almost anywhere else in the OECD.  

A comparative study by AC Stahlberg (2007) estimated that in Australia 62 percent of lifetime benefits received by individuals were financed through redistribution between the rich and the poor and only 38 percent were financed through taxes they paid at another stage of their life-cycle. In comparison, in Sweden, lauded as a paragon of the welfare state, 18 per cent of lifetime benefits involved redistribution between individuals and 82 per cent involved redistribution over different phases of the life-cycle of an individual.

The authors concluded that with a relatively small tax and welfare system Australia achieved the same redistributive impact as countries characterised by much higher taxes and transfers (such as Germany) because Australia relies more on income taxes, which are more progressive than other taxes, and on means-tested cash transfers. Indeed, cash transfers in Australia are also more strongly targeted toward the poor than in most other countries in the OECD and although expenditure on the Australian pension - fixed at 27.7 per cent of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings and rising to 28 per cent average weekly earnings - is relatively low, publicly provided services for the elderly enhance retirement incomes by 35 per cent for those who qualify for a pension.

5.13 Too much tax is never enough

Complaints that ‘10 per cent of Australians received 38 per cent of all superannuation tax concessions‘ rarely note that ‘the top 10 per cent of working age persons pay 50 per cent of personal income tax.’

In 2012/13, the most recent year for which the ATO provides these calculations, individual income tax returns showed that the top three per cent of income earners paid 27 per cent of all net tax and the next six per cent paid 20 per cent of all net tax. So, the top nine per cent paid 47 per cent of all net tax. The next 30 percent paid 42 per cent of all net tax, meaning that the top 39 per cent paid 89 per cent of all net income tax.

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67 Mauro Pisu, Income inequality in OECD Countries: What are the Drivers and Policy Options?, Peter Hoeller, Isabelle Joumard, Isabell Koske, (eds) p.137
68 Isabelle Joumard, Mauro Pisu and Debbie Bloch, OECD Journal: Economic Studies - Volume 2012, p.6
Thus less than 40 per cent of taxpayers paid almost 90 per cent of all income tax.  

Those statistics are not an anomaly. The Henry Tax review found, using figures from 2005-06, that the top 20 per cent of taxpayers paid 59 per cent of all net tax. Since 2005-06 this distribution is likely to have been further skewed with the introduction of Temporary Budget Repair levy of 2 per cent in 2014 on taxable incomes of $180,000 and the increase in the Medicare levy from 1.5 per cent to 2 per cent in July 2014, especially considering that the bottom 20 per cent of adults are exempted from the Medicare levy.

‘Fair is obviously in the eye of the beholder, but fair, I think, for Australians, means that the burden of tax is best borne by those able to pay it’ said Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. In fact the bottom 26 per cent of income earners don’t pay any net income tax and the next 35 per cent pay only 11 per cent of net tax, so the bottom 61 per cent of people paid only 11 per cent of all net income tax. The question might therefore be asked whether it is fair that many who could afford to make some contribution make virtually none.

### 5.14 High transaction costs

Australia’s compulsory superannuation also suffers from high transaction costs.

A study in 2003 found the system to be inefficient, with low returns and high cost due to the fragmentation of accounts, lack of competition and the existence of severe principal-agent problems, as trustees didn’t appear to act in the interests of members.

A 2014 paper found that Australians on average, pay fees of 1.2 percent on their superannuation balances, three times more than the median OECD rate, that reducing fees by half could save account holders $10 billion a year and concluded it was the largest single opportunity for micro-economic reform in Australia. Author Jim Minifie wrote, ‘Two main reforms will reduce the cost of superannuation. Government should establish a tender for the right to run the best-priced default fund for new job starters, and the tax return process should allow taxpayers to match their fund with the low-cost winners of the default tender – and to switch on the spot if they choose.’

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76 Michael Drew and Jon Stanford, A Review of Australia’s Compulsory Superannuation Scheme After a Decade, March 2003. The study found that around 50 per cent of people are members of retail funds, which were characterized by low investment returns relative to a standard benchmark and high cost with a total expense ratio exceeding two per cent of assets under management, and entry and exit fees accounting for 3.5 per cent of funds under management. Further, members of industry funds tended to have low accumulated balances, which added to the cost of the system.

In 2015, the OECD reported operating expenses as a share of total investments were found to be eight times higher in Australia than in countries where those expenses were lowest (Figure 10). In the Netherlands, Denmark and Finland operating expenses were only 0.1 per cent as a share of total investment compared with 0.8 per cent in Australia.78

Figure 10 Australia’s operating expenses eight times higher than Netherlands, Denmark, Finland.
Source: OECD, 201579

Pension funds’ operating expenses as a share of total investments in selected OECD countries, 2013

As a percentage of total investment

These high expenses, incurred each year, impede accumulation and waste resources.

The 2014 Financial System Inquiry (FSI) found that superannuation fees had not fallen by as much as expected, given the massive increase in funds under management, which should have translated into substantial economies of scale80. Rather the benefits of any cost reductions appear to have been captured by trustees managing the funds at the expense of members’ retirement incomes.

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78 OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2015 – OECD and G20 indicators, December 2015, p. 197
79 Ibid.
The OECD notes that countries such as Australia with defined contribution systems and a large numbers of small funds do have higher operating costs than countries with only a few funds offering either defined benefit, hybrid, or collective defined contribution pension arrangements but even allowing for that the FSI reported that system growth and scale could have reduced fees by 45 basis points and that two-thirds of the estimated benefits from scale and lower margins over the past decade had been offset by increases in fund costs.

Treasury’s submission to the FSI said the sector needed to continue to improve its technical efficiency – for example by reducing the use of costly manual, paper-based systems – to reduce fees.

High costs are not just driven by inefficiency. A major part of the problem, according to Treasury, is the separation of ownership of funds from those who manage the funds, which opens up the risk that managers maximise their own interests at the expense of those whose funds they are managing. It warned that, ‘these risks rise when there is a potentially complex decision to be made, with possible asymmetric information and disengaged members.’

5.15 Retirement roulette

This risk is part of a broader problem. A consequence of making superannuation compulsory, barely noted at the time, was the transfer of risk from the employer to the employee. Under earlier defined benefit schemes, the retiree knew exactly how much they would receive in retirement and the risk was largely borne by the employer, who could spread it over time and through financial markets. In the 1970s, about 40 per cent of workers had superannuation coverage predominantly in defined benefit schemes rising to 62 per cent in 1988. However, between 1985 and 2000 almost all defined benefit schemes were closed. Under the new defined contribution schemes, the risk and the uncertainty, as well as the responsibility for managing retirement savings was shifted to individuals. Trapped in a complex system that is constantly changing, many feel daunted by this prospect.

The goal of the system was to achieve reasonable replacement rates in the long term through individual savings; but the process of establishing private superannuation has largely eliminated the legacy defined benefit schemes, which despite their obvious deficiencies (including limited

81 OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2015 – OECD and G20 indicators, December 2015
84 Ibid.
86 The exception was workers under awards, which directed contributions to industry super funds. While this reduced the burden on individuals, it also eliminated competition and choice, which were intended to be the guardians of the system, and created serious principal-agent problems.
coverage) met that goal reasonably well. Now, only a few still survive, notably those covering Commonwealth public servants and federal parliamentarians, and most are closed to new entrants. The vast majority of superannuation savers shoulder the risk of managing their superannuation accounts.

Ironically, the politicians and Treasury officials who designed the retirement roulette that retirees are obliged to play, are loath to play it themselves. Instead they continue to enjoy the security of a generous defined benefit pension, worth up to 75 percent of their highest salary, for life, courtesy of the taxpayers. The scheme closed in 2004 but the value of the total accrued liabilities for the 501 contributors and pensioners is $833 million, with an average liability of $1.663 million per member.

Middle-income earners also need to accumulate high savings early in their working careers so those savings can compound over time. Yet those are the years in which Higher Education Contributions Scheme debts accrue and need to be paid off, followed by family formation and child rearing which make other, often more pressing, demands on incomes.

Traditionally, these problems were mainly addressed by defined benefits schemes. Employers effectively contributed a higher share of the accumulating fund in the early years of an employee’s career, with that share decreasing as the employee’s income rose, while the whole structure was tax-sheltered. It is no coincidence that the high replacement rates achieved in other OECD countries all involve some form of earnings-related, defined benefit scheme. The Mercer study which benchmarked Australia against high-performing economies, looked at the retirement income for an average salary earner in Australia and estimated that they would be 20 per cent better off in Canada, 11 percent better off in Switzerland, 18 percent better off in the UK and 11 percent better off in the US. Moreover, there is a great deal of evidence that middle-income earners prefer the income security and low transactions costs of defined benefit schemes rather than the retirement roulette of defined contribution schemes.

The move to a defined contribution model in Australia, which coincided with the introduction of compulsory superannuation, eliminated the defined benefit solution without putting in place an effective alternative. Rather, it shifted substantial, difficult-to-diversify risk on to savers, along with high transactions costs, and compounded the problem by taxing earnings at quite high rates, impeding accumulation.


90 Negative gearing has made it possible for some people with relatively low incomes to make a leveraged investment early in their career, which will compound over a lifetime to provide income in retirement. A fair retirement savings system should endeavor to treat retirement savings made outside the superannuation system neutrally, particularly if they are provide a supplement to inadequate savings within superannuation.

High capital gains tax

For a number of reasons including the inflexibility of the system, the fact that it is still maturing, and the constant tinkering with the rules which increases complexity and reduces confidence, many middle-income earners have saved outside the superannuation system, for example by purchasing negatively geared investment properties. Labor’s policy is to change the tax treatment of negative gearing which is seen by many as an evil tax loophole that should be closed. In reality, the ability to deduct expenses incurred in earning revenue is an accepted principle in our tax system which offers middle-income Australians who have little knowledge of investing a way of leveraging their savings. Now that it is possible to make such investments within the superannuation system, it is proving popular with middle-income Australians.

But for those who have saved for their retirement outside the superannuation system, the taxation of capital gains in Australia, which is high by international standards, also erodes their retirement savings. New Zealand, for example, has no capital gains tax. Nor does Belgium, Czech Republic, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland or Turkey and the OECD simple average tax rate on capital gains is only 18.4 per cent.

In contrast, in Australia capital gains are treated as income for taxation purposes. This can result in very high effective tax rates on long-term savings, particularly on assets such as real estate where the gain can only be realised in one tax year; not only is the nominal gain far higher than the real gain because of inflation but additionally the gain cannot be retrospectively smoothed out and added to actual taxable income in each year. The Capital Gains Tax Discount does not fully address this problem for long-held assets.

The annual caps on concessional contributions to superannuation also constrain the ability of individuals to transfer capital gains into superannuation. The caps limit the amount that can be contributed and take no account of the fact that an individual may not have had sufficient disposable income to make concessional contributions in earlier years and may have accumulated very little in superannuation over a lifetime, for a variety of reasons including low income, unemployment, self-employment, part-time employment or unpaid employment working in the voluntary or charity sector or caring for children or disabled or elderly relatives.

92 Deloitte, Shedding light on the debate – Mythbusting tax reform, 26 October, 2015, p. 15
93 Ibid, p 2
5.17 The Middle Income Retirement Deficit

Bodies such as the World Bank have often praised Australia’s compulsory superannuation but in reality middle-income Australians have been poorly served by the post-defined benefits arrangements.

The interaction of high progressive income taxes, high capital gains tax, high fees and charges in the superannuation system, low caps on contributions and the high taxation of superannuation by international standards make it difficult for middle income earners to achieve the superannuation balances they need to fund their retirement.

Since middle-income earners are inefficiently constrained by taxation from fully funding their retirement, the rational option is to structure their affairs to qualify for a part pension.

The transition to compulsory, private, individual, defined contribution superannuation was always going to impose relatively high costs and create significant problems by shifting almost all risk and high transactions costs on to retirees, and especially those on middle incomes. It has also raised an obvious problem of transition, that is, what would happen to Middle Australia while the system matured, assuming it would ultimately mature.

Those problems have now come home to roost. Middle Australia faces high taxes on its savings, low income replacement rates in retirement and greater risk and uncertainty than under the old defined benefits pension schemes.

94 World Bank, Averting the old-age crisis: policies to protect the old and promote growth, (World Bank, Washington, DC, 1994), p.153
Proposed changes to superannuation

6.1 Defining the purpose of superannuation

On Budget night, 3 May 2016, the government announced its tax reform agenda for superannuation. This consisted of setting out, for the first time, a clear objective for superannuation – to provide income in retirement to substitute or supplement the Age Pension – as well as a range of measures that flow from the new objective.

That definition seems no more sensible than claiming the purpose of work is to ‘substitute or supplement’ the dole, and to set income taxes accordingly. Superannuation serves a social purpose as well as an economic one. It should enhance efficiency by allowing us to transfer income earned while working to retirement, preserving living standards in old age. It should also encourage self-reliance and reward hard work, promoting the seemingly forgotten virtue of thrift which underpins a society in which people take responsibility for their future.

Private savings shouldn’t be seen as just an add-on to the social safety net; it is the public pension that ought to be seen as the backup, assisting those who have not been in a position to save for their retirement. For superannuation to play its intended role as a lifetime savings vehicle that allows people to maintain their living standards in retirement, it needs to be easier to access and appropriately taxed so that middle-income Australians who achieve a comfortable standard of living through work can maintain their living standards in retirement.

6.2 Measures which make it harder to save

The government says several existing measures in the tax treatment of superannuation are inconsistent with its new objective because they benefit people who will never depend on the age pension and can save outside the superannuation system. The new measures make it harder to contribute to the superannuation system but will, the government claims, only affect the wealthy. Treasurer Scott Morrison says the changes are ‘appropriately targeted’ to allow people to secure an ‘adequate retirement income’ and prevent superannuation from being used as ‘an open-ended savings vehicle for the wealthy to accumulate large balances underpinned by tax breaks far more than required for an adequate retirement’.

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
In reality all contributions to superannuation are capped and provisions that allowed people to build up very large balances no longer apply, so it is impossible for superannuation to be an ‘open-ended savings vehicle.’ Far from only affecting high-income earners who are gaming the system, the measures will significantly affect Middle Australia, which is already poorly served by our complex retirement income arrangements. These measures are discussed below.

6.2.1 Taxes on earnings in retirement above $1.6 million

The government will introduce a $1.6 million superannuation transfer balance cap, putting an upper limit, from July 1, 2017, on funds that can be transferred into, or retained in, a pension fund. Only earnings in pension funds will be tax-free in retirement. Funds above the $1.6 million cap will have to be returned to an accumulation fund and taxed at 15 per cent or withdrawn from superannuation. Retirees who do not fully utilise the $1.6 million transfer balance cap when moving assets into pension phase will be able to move in additional funds up to the transfer balance cap at a later date or dates and the amount will be calculated as a percentage of whatever the cap is at that date. However, this is the only reason that funds can be transferred into the pension fund. If the pension balance drops due to poor investment returns and the transfer balance cap has already been reached, there is no possibility of putting more money in, even if the retiree’s pension fund savings have been wiped out. On the other hand, if the pension account generates strong returns they can be retained in the pension fund.

Critically, the cap is only indexed to CPI (in increments of $100,000) not to average weekly earnings, so its value will be eroded over time in relation to wages and the pension. And the value of the cap will fluctuate dramatically in real terms because of the volatility of assets. For example, the Government has greatly over-estimated the value of the cap by assuming a 5.5 percent rate of return in the retirement phase; since the funds have to generate income with the same reliability as the Age Pension, the appropriate risk-free rate of return, the 10-year government bond rate, which reached a record low of 1.82 percent in August 2016. This implies that $1.6 million would generate an income stream that is far lower than $88,000 that the Government assumes. The government says the balance cap will affect fewer than one per cent of fund members and will raise $2.0 billion over the forward estimates period. That has been questioned since high net worth individuals may switch their funds out of superannuation into other savings vehicles including investment companies, annuities, franked income, geared property insurance bonds, family trusts, or adopt a downsizing the family home strategy, all of which may reduce revenue raised. It has been estimated that around 140,000 persons have more than $1.5 million in superannuation, 100,000 in excess of $2 million and about 70,000 in excess of $2.5 million. In 2012-13 24,000 retired members with account balances in excess of $2 million received around $5.2 billion in income stream payments and a further 51,700 retired members with account balances between $1 million and $2 million received around $4.9 billion in payments. Those income streams would presumably be far lower today and in the future in current interest rate environment.

6.2.2 Labor’s policy – taxes on earnings above $75,000

In April 2015, Labor announced its superannuation policy. The centrepiece was a proposal to impose, from 1 July 2017, a 15 percent tax on superannuation pension earnings of more than $75,000.\(^{104}\) This was a harsher version of the superannuation policy that Labor announced in April 2013 when it proposed a 15 percent tax on earnings of more than $100,000\(^{105}\). Labor said its policy was designed to affect only fully independent self-funded retirees since the income test for the Age Pension (singles and partnered) is under the $75,000 threshold. The measure was intended to affect approximately 60,000 people with superannuation balances in excess of $1.5 million although the research paper Labor cited said around 140,000 people had balances of more than $1.5 million in superannuation\(^{106}\).

Labor maintains its changes will only affect superannuants with balances over $1.5 million. In reality, volatility in rates of return mean much lower balances will generate earnings that exceed $75,000 in good years\(^{107}\). As a result, very large accounts may contribute barely a third of the revenue Labor hopes to raise\(^{108}\). For example, if Labor’s policies were already in place, retirees with balances below the cut-off point for the part pension would have had to pay tax on their superannuation income in five of the last 11 years\(^{109}\).

And as inflation erodes the $75,000 threshold in real terms and increases the nominal value of accounts, more superannuants will exceed Labor’s threshold, shifting an ever greater share of the tax burden on to retirees whose savings are little more than half the actuarial value of the full age pension\(^{110}\).

Thus, Labor’s proposal will become an increasingly significant tax on the middle class, which is already harshly treated by our retirement income system\(^{111}\). That is all the more likely as the well-off will be better placed to switch assets from superannuation to other forms of savings if it is tax-effective to do so\(^{112}\). That switching means Labor’s hopes of raising $9bn in net revenue are likely to be dashed\(^{113}\). In addition, taxing relatively small balances, even infrequently, will deplete them more rapidly and push people on to the Age Pension sooner and for longer, particularly since there is no symmetrical offset when returns are poor\(^{114}\). A rough estimate of the impact is that part pension eligibility for initial balances in the $350,000 to $500,000 range could be 5 to 10 per cent greater, with broadly similar effects for means-tested age care payments, both reducing net


\(^{105}\) Hon Bill Shorten, MP Media Release, “Reforms to make the Superannuation System Fairer”, 5 April 2013

\(^{106}\) Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Superannuation and high account balances, April 2015


\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.

\(^{110}\) Ibid.


\(^{112}\) Ibid.

\(^{113}\) Ibid.

\(^{114}\) Ibid.
revenues. There would also be broader efficiency costs as some non-compulsory savings were diverted into assets such as owner-occupied housing, further distorting markets and increasing vulnerability to property price bubbles.

6.2.3 Lifetime non-concessional caps and reduced annual caps

From Budget night, 3 May 2016, subject to passage through the parliament, the cap on concessional contributions will be reduced to $25,000 a year for all contributors, regardless of age. Currently, concessional contributions are capped at $30,000 for those under age 50 and at $35,000 for those aged 50 and over. The government claims that capping concessional contributions at $25,000 per year will still allow individuals to accumulate significant amounts of tax advantaged concessional superannuation but in fact that capacity is significantly reduced.

From 1 July 2017, the government will also introduce a lifetime cap of $500,000 for non-concessional contributions, which will be indexed to average weekly ordinary time earnings. This cap will take into account all non-concessional contributions made on or after 1 July 2007. This eliminates the possibility of making non-concessional contributions for anyone who has already made non-concessional contributions of $500,000 or more since 1 July 2007. Contributions made from 7:30pm AEST on 3 May 2016 that exceed the cap (taking into account all previous non-concessional contributions) have to be removed or will be subject to the current penalty tax arrangements of 49 per cent. However, contributions made before 7:30pm on Budget night would not have to be removed and would not be subject to penalty tax arrangements.

This replaces the existing annual cap of $180,000, or $540,000 every three years under the bring-forward rule. This meant that in a relatively short space of time individuals including those who, for a variety of reasons had very low superannuation balances – due to low income employment, unemployment, self-employment, part-time employment and unpaid employment in the voluntary or charity sector or caring for children or disabled or elderly relatives - could substantially improve their financial security as they approached retirement, if they had the means to do so.

No detailed modeling of the impacts on savers has been released but the new caps seem harsh. The reduced concessional caps make it harder for everyone to increase their superannuation balances even though most superannuation balances are not sufficient to allow people to maintain their living standards in retirement.

The threshold of the lifetime cap on non-concessional contributions seems arbitrary. Someone who has made $500,000 in non-concessional contributions since 1 July 2007 may still have a balance well below the $1.6 million that the government has said retirees may rely on to generate a tax-free income in retirement.

115 Ibid.
116 Ibid
117 There is overwhelming evidence that most people are only in a position to make substantial contributions to superannuation as they approach retirement.
Many countries have caps they periodically revise on retirement savings or on the income that can be derived from public and private pension schemes. To that extent, even when revising existing caps, or imposing new ones is undesirable, it is not unheard of. Yet given how crucial superannuation is to the living standards of older Australians, changes to the caps deserve the most utmost scrutiny. They must, in particular, be assessed in terms of their impacts on what our superannuation system is trying to achieve.

The questions the government needs to address are:

1. With interest rates low and returns volatile, will the new caps allow middle income Australians to achieve acceptable replacement rates in retirement?118
2. Can savers in their late 40s or 50s, their peak earning years, whose superannuation balances are too low to make them financially secure in retirement, catch up?119
3. Can middle income families in which a spouse with an interrupted work history was planning on catch up, perhaps by selling an investment property and placing the proceeds into superannuation, still do so?120 And if not, why not?

In each case, the answer appears to be that the government’s proposed changes will make it even more difficult for Australians on middle incomes to achieve acceptable replacement rates in retirement, making a system that is already inadequate worse.

6.2.4 Doubling taxes on high-income earner contributions

The government will double the tax on contributions to superannuation for those earning more than $250,000 (which will include those earning $225,000 who wish to make a voluntary contribution up to the limit of $25,000). It will also apply to members of defined benefit schemes but exclude State higher-level office holders and Commonwealth judges. Up to now, only people earning over $300,000 pay 30 cents in the dollar on contributions. The government appears to have copied this proposal from Labor, which announced it in April 2015. Labor estimated around 110,000 people would be affected by the new arrangements and that the measure would raise $5.1 billion over a decade121. The government estimates that the measure will raise around $2.5 billion over the forward estimates. The Greens want to go even further doubling the tax on superannuation contributions for everyone earning more than $150,000 and increasing the tax from 15 cents to 22 cents for those earning between $100,000 and $150,000.122 They say their proposal would raise around $10 billion over four years.

Doubling the tax on superannuation contributions for those earning over $250,000 will increase taxes on lifetime incomes and undermine incentives to work, save and invest, particularly in superannuation. While it is not clear just how high effective tax rates on superannuation will be,

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119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
what is certain is that it will lead back towards the situation prior to the Costello reforms, when
the OECD found Australia’s effective tax rates on superannuation were among the highest in the
advanced economies.

6.2.5 Tax exemption removed for transition to retirement earnings

The government has dealt a grave blow to the Transition to Retirement (TTR) provisions by
removing the tax exemption on earnings of assets supporting Transition to Retirement Income
Streams from 1 July 2017 (income streams of individuals over preservation age but not retired).
The current TTR tax regime encourages people approaching retirement to keep working, either
full-time to boost their superannuation or with reduced hours, in which case the policy softens
the drop in income. If workers choose to boost their superannuation they can salary sacrifice
up to the current annual cap of $35,000 into an accumulation account while moving the rest of
their funds into retirement phase, which allows earnings on investments to be tax free and while
drawing down between 4 and 10 per cent of their superannuation as a tax free income stream
(not a lump sum) so that they don’t suffer an equivalent drop in disposable income. Essentially,
they get the benefits of moving into retirement phase while still be able to work and contribute to
superannuation.

The purpose of these provisions is to reduce the disincentives to work of people who have reached
preservation age and could therefore retire. There is strong evidence internationally that as
people approach retirement, their labour force participation decisions become highly sensitive
to tax rates. One disincentive to work is that earnings on investment in retirement are tax-free.
These provisions increase the incentive to work, albeit at a modest cost. That is advantageous not
just because these people are at peak earning capacity but because the longer people work,
the greater their savings, and the less likely that they will need to draw, in part or full, on the Age
Pension. The introduction of TTR provisions was followed by a substantial increase in participation
rates. The government has said that there are currently 115,000 people on a TTR income stream
but it may be double that and many are on average incomes. Preventing these people from
boosting their superannuation balances seems to contradict the government’s claim that only
wealthy people will be adversely affected by its proposed changes. What the government has not
done and ought to do is to show that the social benefits in terms of additional revenue raised by
the measure exceed the social costs in terms of reduced participation and lower superannuation
balances.

The measure is meant to raise government revenue of $640 million over the forward estimates
period but will not raise that sum if it discourages older people from working and boosting their
superannuation before retirement. Indeed, if it does that, it may increase demands on the Age
Pension and thus on the taxpayer in the long run.

election-2016/federal-election-2016-kelly-odwyer-explains-superannuation/news-story/9a3343b55582660bf8564096a75d905f,
Viewed 6 September 2016
6.2.6 Who will be affected

The government says its changes will adversely affect only a very small number of wealthy, high-income individuals who have large superannuation balances, well in excess of $1.6 million. It bases this on aggregate ATO data over the last decade which it says shows that these are the only people who, in the past, have made substantial concessional and non-concessional contributions.

But the past behaviour of taxpayers is not necessarily a reliable indicator of the future retirement income plans and aspirations of individuals, much less their needs. The ATO data of the last decade may be skewed by the following factors.

First, most large balances in superannuation owe their existence to features of the system that no longer exist.

Second, people who have defined benefit pensions don’t need to save as much in superannuation. As the proportion of people on defined benefit pensions declines, the proportion of people who will rely on superannuation to maintain a reasonable standard of living in retirement will grow.

Third, tax laws treat income from capital gains as income for tax purposes. Thus, people who have low or no income appear to the ATO to be high-income earners in the year that they realize the capital gain.

On the other hand, as the government reduces access to the pension, individuals need to save more in superannuation, not less. And it will be many years until everyone in the system has had the chance to make the compulsory and voluntary contributions over 45 years that should, if the system is properly designed, allow people to achieve reasonable retirement rates.

OECD data shows that average income earners are not achieving reasonable replacement rates. The government’s data seems to confirm this in that at present the average superannuation balance of a 60 year-old is expected to be $240,000 in 2017-18. This would generate an income of around $28,000 for 25 years including the Age Pension\textsuperscript{124}, around a third of full-time adult average weekly earnings, which are just under $82,000.

Clearly, there is a need for average Australians to be able to save more for their retirement and that need will grow. It seems highly probable that measures that may have only affected the wealthy in the past will adversely affect middle-income Australians who simply want to maintain their standard of living in retirement.

\textsuperscript{124} Figures calculated using Unisuper Pension Calculator, https://super.towerswatson.com/unisuper/apphtml/pensionincome.html#/
calculator/pensionincome/start
6.3 **Measures to make the system more flexible**

Despite making it harder for middle and upper income people to contribute to superannuation, the government says it also wants to make the system more flexible to align with the changing work-life patterns of modern Australia. This is a commendable intention but it is largely stymied by the measures that make it harder to save as discussed below.

6.3.1 **Catch up concessions**

Individuals with superannuation balances under $500,000 who don’t reach their concessional cap in a given year will be able to carry forward their unused cap amounts over up to five consecutive years. The government says this is intended to benefit women with low superannuation balances that have broken employment records due to childbearing and child-rearing responsibilities.

While the carryover provision does mean that people will be able to make a catch-up contribution of up to $125,000 at the end of a 5-year period, it is still substantially less than the $175,000 they could have contributed over a five-year period under the current system if they made the full concessional contribution each year and if they were aged over 50.

The government has given no explanation as to why the cut-off threshold for this provision is a superannuation balance of $500,000. As Jeremy Cooper has written, ‘Assumptions and assertions that $500,000 or even $1 million in superannuation, in the current environment, will guarantee a comfortable retirement are suspect.’

It would seem sensible for the government to allow people to accumulate sufficient assets so that they didn’t require either the pension or the Commonwealth Healthcare Card. While determining what superannuation balance would achieve that goal is complex, there seems to be a strong case not to set caps which prevent people accumulating $1.6 million.

Indeed, it seems unfair that this measure prevents people who have a balance of $500,000 or more from carrying forward their unused caps to make catch up concessions as their superannuation balance may be lower than they would otherwise have been due to periods of low-income employment, unemployment, self-employment, part-time employment or unpaid employment in the voluntary sector or caring for children or disabled or elderly relatives.

Contrast this with those who are able to accumulate $1.6 million within superannuation (whether they use catch up concessions or not); they were probably able to do so because they were able to work without interruption and were sufficiently well remunerated that they could make voluntary contributions each year.

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Separately, since the lifetime cap on non-concessional contributions commences in 2007 because reliable records exist from that period, it seems only fair that the carry forward for unused concessional caps should also commence in 2007.

Finally, the government makes the case that a lifetime cap on non-concessional contributions is superior to an annual cap on non-concessional contributions because it allows people to make contributions when they are able to do so. The same principle should apply to concessional contributions – a lifetime cap on concessional contributions would allow people who had not been in a position to make contributions at an earlier period to contribute if they were able to later in their life.

6.3.2 Removal of the work test for contributions up to age 75

From 1 July 2017, people aged 65 to 74 will no longer have to satisfy a work test to be able to make contributions to superannuation and they will also be able to receive contributions from their spouse. This is a good idea but the contributions will be subject to the new lifetime cap limiting the extent to which middle-income retirees can attempt to make their superannuation last longer. The measure is estimated to have a cost to revenue of $130.0 million over the forward estimates period.

6.3.3 Low-income offsets

The low income superannuation offset is intended to avoid the situation in which low-income earners pay more tax on savings placed into superannuation than on income earned outside of superannuation. The measure is estimated to have a cost to the Budget of $1.6 billion over the forward estimates period. It will increase low-income earners’ superannuation by up to $500. Most people on low incomes will still get the full pension.

From 1 July 2017, the Government will also increase access to the low-income spouse superannuation tax offset by raising the income threshold for the low-income spouse to $37,000 from $10,800. The low income spouse tax offset provides up to $540 per annum for the contributing spouse and the government says it will boost retirement savings of low income women. The measure is estimated to have a cost to revenue of $10.0 million over the forward estimates period.

Both of these measures seem misguided. The cost of managing small savings in a private savings scheme takes a very large percentage of annual earnings. Boosting the superannuation balances of low-income earners will therefore probably be of greater benefit to industry superannuation funds which hold most of these small funds than to the recipients. The main impact of these policies seems to be to shift expenditure from the pension to the offset, while increasing spending overall. It is therefore difficult to understand how this measure can be justified.
6.3.4 Tax deductions for superannuation up to age 75

The introduction of income tax deductions for personal contributions to a complying superannuation fund up to an individual’s concessional cap and up to age 75 is a positive measure but is limited by the government’s tight caps. This will impose a small net cost on the government.

6.3.5 Tax exemption on earnings for annuities

The extension of the tax exemption on earnings in the retirement phase to products such as deferred lifetime annuities and group self-annuitisation products is a positive measure that was also recommended in the Henry Tax Review but needs to go much further.

The Henry Tax Review also recommended a number of other measures that the government should undertake to support the development of a longevity insurance market.126

Broader recommendations on the government’s proposals

7.1 Review the retirement system and rethink reform

The government should heed the call of the Secretary of Treasury to undertake a proper review of the retirement income system considering the interaction of the age pension, superannuation and the taxation of saving\textsuperscript{127}. It should give the task to the Productivity Commission.

The objective should be to move towards neutrality between current and future consumption and away from measures that penalize savings, as doing so imposes high efficiency costs and undermines living standards. Superannuation should not be seen as a source of revenue to fund other government programs. Its purpose is to generate retirement income. Governments that tinker with superannuation for budgetary reasons run the grave risk of seriously undermining the system\textsuperscript{128}.

The focus should be on ensuring that Middle Australia can save enough through superannuation to maintain its standard of living in retirement. The government should formulate its policies with these people in mind rather than the very small number of people who accumulated very high balances through provisions that no longer apply.

7.2 Revisit caps and taxes

From the point of view of securing acceptable replacement rates for middle-income Australians, the caps imposed by the government, both on concessional and non-concessional contributions and on the retirement balance, appear to be too low and the taxes on savings too high.

The government needs to calculate a retirement balance cap taking into account the capital requirements to safely and reliably generate replacement incomes, real interest rates, appropriate discount rates and volatility in asset values.


\textsuperscript{128} “Dr. [Ken] Henry said the key risk to superannuation was overzealous regulation, and governments who tinkered with the system for budgetary means risked undermining the system,” James Frost. Australian Financial Review, 18 March 2015 http://www.afr.com/news/policy/tax/ken-henry-says-increase-in-gst-inevitable-20150318-1m29xp#ixzz4JRVRtKzs, Viewed 8 September 2016
Any caps need to be set so that people can reach the maximum indicative balance through catchup contributions if they are unable to reach it simply by making the maximum annual contributions.

As recommended by the Henry Tax Review, the government should increase the effective rate of savings delivered by the superannuation system by reducing the tax on the earnings on savings, which erodes savings annually. The Henry Tax Review recommended reducing the tax on earnings to 7.5 percent. This should be considered as part of a longer-term transition to an EET (see below).

7.3 **Make the system more flexible in other ways**

The compulsory contribution to superannuation, the Superannuation Guarantee, is legislated to rise from 9.5 percent to 12 percent in 0.5 percent increments starting 1 July 2021, yet these mandatory contributions impose high costs, in terms of foregone consumption, on income earners at points in the lifecycle when they have many other commitments – tertiary education, family formation, purchasing a home.

Instead of heavy-handed compulsion, the priority should be to make saving attractive by reducing inefficiently high taxes on saving and increasing the flexibility in the system so that when people have additional funds to contribute, usually later in life, they are able to do so.

Allowing people flexibility to set their contribution levels below the mandated amount in specified personal circumstances, perhaps subject to them making up the difference later, is an option worthy of consideration. Similarly, imposing limits on superannuation concessional contributions constrains savers' capacity to make up for inadequate savings at earlier stages of their lives.

The caps need to be flexible enough to accommodate large one-off payments, as one of the key ways that people with interrupted earnings and low salaries could make a significant contribution might be through the sale of assets, such as an investment property.

7.4 **Allow assets saved outside superannuation to contribute to the savings balance**

Once the retirement balance that one can use to generate a tax free retirement income has been established, it would make sense to allow people to contribute up to the retirement balance.

It would also make sense to allow assets outside superannuation - for example shares or investment properties – to count as part of the $1.6 million asset base.
That would imply allowing taxpayers to combine those assets for tax purposes at the time of entry into the retirement phase, with all the earnings from those assets being treated as if they were derived from a balance being held in a superannuation account. In other words, at the time of transition, other assets could be contributed up to the amount of the $1.6 million cap. The lifetime caps the government has proposed would need to be flexible enough to accommodate any such transfer.

This proposal raises issues of how any such asset transfer on retirement should be treated from the perspective of the taxation of contributions although it would seem reasonable that they be treated in the same way as other non-concessional contributions. These are issues that would need careful consideration, as would the fiscal consequences.

Nonetheless, if the government holds that, for example, $1.6 million is an appropriate cap on superannuation savings, why should different assets that could contribute to that $1.6 million balance be subjected to different tax treatment?

Rather, the various savings vehicles ought to be treated as neutrally as possible, minimizing the risk of distorting savings decisions. At the same time, such neutral treatment would ensure greater horizontal equity – treating those who are equally placed alike – as it would not be as discriminatory between savers whose savings were in superannuation, and those whose savings were in other assets, as would a cap that applied to superannuation alone.

There is, therefore, a case for moving to a more flexible concept of the ‘savings balance’ of retirees. Such a balance, all elements of which would be given the same tax treatment, would both ease the savings tax on middle Australia and make for a much efficient tax system.

7.5 Reduce fees and charges

Fees and charges in the Australian superannuation system are much higher than in many other OECD countries. This reduces retirement savings across all income levels but because some fees are flat, they have a bigger impact on smaller balances. Since contributions to superannuation are compulsory and the system is complex and opaque, choice alone has been insufficient to drive competition, with most people remaining in a default fund chosen by their employer.

It would be far better to reduce fees and charges for all savers by increasing the competitive pressure on funds. One way to do this would be for the government to tender for a low fee default scheme and give people the option of moving to that scheme when they submit their tax form. This would put greater pressure on funds to reduce fees.
Take the roulette out of retirement – defined benefit pensions from the Future Fund

It is inappropriate for the government to expect middle-income retirees to shoulder the risk associated with living on investment earnings of volatile assets, when individuals cannot diversify that risk in the way that an employer, the government or a pension fund can. An adverse event beyond an individual’s control, such as the Global Financial Crisis, can wipe out an individual’s savings and plunge them into penury.

Given that few retirees can offset falls in income by returning to work, it is hard to see an equity or efficiency case for placing so much financial risk on older Australians, whose only option to manage it is to save more than they ideally would, especially in the only tax advantaged vehicle open to most of them – their own house\textsuperscript{129}.

In addition to market and market timing risk, individuals face longevity risk. An individual can address the risks they face by purchasing an annuity but because the market in Australia is so small, the costs are very high.

The government provides a guaranteed, inflation-indexed income for life at high replacement rates to low-income Australians via the Age Pension. It also provides guaranteed, inflation-indexed income for life, at generous replacement rates to members of public sector defined benefit schemes, underwritten by the Future Fund. To reduce the risk facing retirees, the government should make it possible for middle-income Australians to purchase a defined benefit pension from the Future Fund, with benefits proportional to contributions.

This was discussed at some length in the Henry Tax Review which recommended that the government consider offering an immediate annuity and deferred annuity product that would allow a person to purchase a lifetime income. It recommended that this should be subject to a business case that ensures the accurate pricing of the risks being taken on by the government and added that to limit the government’s exposure to longevity risk, it should consider placing limits on how much income a person could purchase from the government.

7.7 Move towards an EET system of taxation

The government should move towards an EET system for the taxation of superannuation, in which contributions and fund earnings are untaxed and end-benefits are subject to individuals’ full marginal income tax rates in retirement. This is the system used in most of the OECD and with good reason.

The amount an average income earner would accumulate over a lifetime of saving under the current system is reduced by up to 45 percent by the current taxation treatment of superannuation. All other things being equal, a move to an EET system could therefore result in superannuation saving balances that were substantially higher on retirement.

These increased savings would provide more adequately for retirement, giving dignity and independence to retirees while reducing the burden on government by reducing the demand for the Age Pension.

In addition, because withdrawals would be taxed at the marginal rate of income tax, they would reduce the distortion to individuals’ ability to transfer income from working life to retirement, making it easier for individuals to smooth out their income over the lifecycle while ensuring that the government would have a more adequate source of revenue as the population ages.

A move to an EET system would also provide transparency and tax neutrality in retirement between savings accumulated in superannuation and those saved outside of superannuation, as income from all assets would be taxed at the same rate and in the same way, except for owner-occupied housing, which is taxed on a pre-paid consumption basis.

Finally, it would reduce the burden of risk to the individual by not taxing volatile earnings in either the good or bad years but only taxing income once it was available for consumption.

It is often claimed that switching from TEE to EET, TEE or TET would require such complex transitional arrangements over 40 years, with such severe transitional implications for government revenue that it couldn’t be done.

There is no doubt that there are transition issues however, they are entirely manageable and many countries reshape their retirement incomes systems over time (as Australia did not so many years ago). For example, a shift from the current TTE system to an EET system could be phased in by cohort, retaining the TTE for current savers but allowing subsequent cohorts to save on an EET basis. This would minimise the immediate cost in tax revenues. Indeed, a transition to EET would allow the government to continue to receive tax on the contributions and earnings of those in the current system and by the time the government was getting all of its tax from retirement income streams, retirees would make up a substantial share of the population. Alternatively, each cohort could be allowed to accumulate EET balances beginning at differing dates.

Proposals to move to a TEE system also have merit and whether the government taxes contributions or benefits, the single measure that will make the most difference to retirement balances is to reduce or eliminate the tax on superannuation earnings. Indeed, it would be better to accept higher taxes on either contributions or benefits in order to cut the tax on earnings.

Ultimately, what is important is ensuring that whatever form of taxation is adopted the goal of ensuring acceptable retirement incomes is achieved for all Australians and achieved in a manner consistent with fiscal sustainability and economic efficiency.

7.8 Assess equity looking at system as a whole

Equity and fairness need to be assessed viewing the Australian retirement income system as a whole. Given that the system provides income replacement rates for low-income earners that are high by international standards and relatively low for other income earners, the system is anything but biased to the better off. The fact that the tax treatment of superannuation benefits mainly higher-income earners arises because Australia has a highly progressive income tax system.

High income earners get more tax relief because they are carrying a greater share of the tax burden while low income earners get the taxpayer-funded age pension. Ken Henry commented last year that ‘it was always understood that those who have the capacity to save, because they have higher incomes during their working lives, would benefit most from the tax concessions, with lower-income employees benefiting most from the pension.’

It is misleading to consider individual components of a complex tax/transfer system in isolation - any equity issues arising in the tax system should be assessed viewing the system in toto. Fundamentally, the tax system is a poor way of achieving equity goals and piecemeal changes to the tax system made in the name of equity are likely to be costly and counterproductive.

7.9 Define, measure and regularly publish key benchmarks

The government should define, measure and regularly publish key benchmarks - such as target replacement rates, target retirement income streams and lifetime effective tax rates on savings - which show how the system is performing.

Most proposals to increase the taxation of superannuation do not estimate the effective tax rates they would impose on superannuation savings and take no account of the behavioural responses they will elicit. Typically, these proposals distort decisions both about the timing of contributions and about whether to retain savings in superannuation post-retirement or run them down.

7.10 **Adverse changes should not be retrospective**

Adverse changes should not be retrospective in effect, and should recognise that current participants have made long-term plans under the current and previous rules.

7.11 **Don’t increase complexity**

Any changes should not add complexity and should preferably reduce it.

7.12 **Stick to these principles**

Virtually all the changes made in recent years and those currently proposed have flouted these principles. The result is that rather than improving our retirement income system, we are aggravating its deficiencies.
Conclusion - Repairing our retirement system

“We have talked of income from savings as if it possessed a somewhat discreditable character. We have taxed it more and more heavily. We have spoken slightingly of the earning of interest at the very moment when we have advocated new pensions and social schemes.” Robert Menzies\(^{132}\)

Few in Australia are talking about how to reduce the savings deficit of middle-income Australians or the income risk and uncertainty they face as they age. Instead the debate is focused almost exclusively on increasing taxes on superannuation. An indicator of the focus of the debate in Australia is that different proposals are assessed according to the amount of revenue raised, largely without reference to the way in which increased taxes on superannuation will affect living standards in retirement.

Yet as Prime Minister Turnbull has rightly said, ‘If you want less of something you increase taxes on it.’\(^{133}\) Already, under the existing arrangements effective tax rates on superannuation are inefficiently high. Increasing them further and reducing the access to superannuation savings for middle-income Australians by reducing the caps for concessional and non-concessional contributions will almost certainly make a bad situation worse.

What is clear is that governments should not tax retirement savings at rates that make it difficult or impossible for savers to secure reasonable living standards in retirement based on the living standards they achieved during their working life. Nor should government taxes on retirement savings distort consumption decisions, undermining the quality of life in old age and reducing overall economic efficiency (an important component of which is the ability to efficiently smooth consumption over the life cycle). Yet in our current system, where it will be decades before a substantial share of the population have saved in superannuation for 35 years or more, that is what our taxes do.

Returning the budget to surplus is a matter of the utmost importance but doing so at the expense of retirement savings has very high welfare costs. As a result, taxes on those savings should only be increased if there are no less-costly ways of restoring fiscal balance. In reality, there are many such options, ranging from eliminating wasteful spending to increasing the tax take by reducing our very high tax-free threshold, which leads to many people making no contribution to the cost of the services they consume.

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\(^{133}\) ABC 7:30, “Interview with Prime Minister Turnbull”, 26 April 2016 http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2015/i4450761.htm, Viewed 26 August 2016
There seems to be no recognition by the government of the need to seriously rethink the system rather than tinkering with its parameters, which is essential if middle-income Australians are going to be able to enjoy income security and maintain their living standards in retirement.

The virtue of providing for oneself has been forgotten and the necessity of ensuring that the tax and transfer system doesn’t make that impossible is not on the agenda. Instead, the Age Pension has become the cornerstone of retirement and everything else is portrayed as a ‘concession,’ as if the purpose of the system were to redistribute from rich to poor rather than to allow savers to smooth out their own income consumption.

On the day he became Prime Minister-designate, Malcolm Turnbull told Australians he would lead a ‘thoroughly Liberal government.’ It is therefore to be hoped that he will take to heart the words of Robert Menzies who criticized government policy designed not to ‘help the thrifty’ and ‘encourage independence’ but rather to harvest ‘the votes of the thriftless…to defeat the thrifty.’

This, after all, could be a tempting prospect. Australians have more than $2 trillion locked up in superannuation. So it is hardly surprising that governments and oppositions should hungrily eye those funds, driven by the desire to raise revenue for spending and giving little thought as to whether people will have sufficient savings to enjoy a reasonable degree of income security in retirement. An opinion poll published in The Australian on February 3 reported that 62 per cent of voters favoured raising tax rates on superannuation contributions by high-income earners, 27 per cent were opposed and 11 per cent undecided. Pandering to this sort of populism however has dangerous consequences and will not solve the problems we face. Rather, precisely the same sentiments will lead to the revenues thus gathered being squandered, recreating the fiscal problems the tax changes were intended to address.

Moreover, even were the long run fiscal consequences less adverse, it is inefficient to distort the choice between current consumption and consumption in retirement – that is, to prevent income earners from managing their spending through the life course. Rather, the tax system should treat consumption as neutrally as possible over time. The harm those distortions impose, including the risk of hardship in old age, should weigh as heavily in public decision-making as the budgetary impacts.

‘You do not expect much from conservative governments, but you do expect them to believe in thrift,’ former Prime Minister Paul Keating said addressing a summit on Australian Pensions and Investment in 2007. Unfortunately, neither side of politics seems to be focused on encouraging thrift.

Yet nowhere is thrift more important than in saving for our retirement. As Menzies said in his ‘Forgotten People’ speech: ‘If the motto is to be “Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow you will

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die, and if it chances you don’t die, the State will look after you; but if you don’t eat, drink and be merry and save, we shall take your savings from you,” then the whole business of life would become foundationless.137

Menzies spoke in that speech, delivered in the dark days of war in May 1942, of a world that needed to have its sense of values “violently set right”. “Have we realised and recognised these things or is most of our policy designed to discourage or penalise thrift, to encourage dependence on the State?”

No question could be more pertinent today, as an unholy consensus seems to be emerging that when it comes to retirement what is needed are more taxes on peoples’ savings to pay for state pensions. The dangers in this approach were apparent even in Menzies’ day.

“We have hastened to make it clear that the provision made by man for his own retirement and old age is not half as sacrosanct as the provision the State would have made for him if he had never saved at all,” he observed.

While the provision of a means-tested pension is a non-negotiable responsibility of modern government, it is no less important for governments not to unnecessarily reduce individuals’ incentive and ability to provide for themselves.

Unfortunately, our compulsory superannuation system has been undermined by the shortsighted determination of governments to constantly tinker with tax arrangements. Each year, the capacity of compound interest to grow people’s savings has been damaged by these taxes. This is why, almost a quarter of a century after compulsory superannuation started, only 20 per cent of people fully fund their retirement and the other 80 per cent receive a full or part pension that is benchmarked at 25 per cent of average weekly earnings.

As the government prepares to take its superannuation reforms to the parliament, it should embrace its philosophical roots and put tax cuts for superannuation and saving at the centre of its retirement incomes policy.