Barely a couple of hours after receiving the interim report from the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, Anthony Albanese held a press conference to say he supported all 14 recommendations.
The Prime Minister rejected questions about flaws identified in the report. He claimed “Commissioner Bell has found that our existing legal and regulatory frameworks did not hinder our agencies in preventing or responding to the Bondi attack”.
In fact, the interim report says something different, which is that “No agency, either Commonwealth or state, advised that urgent legislative or regulatory reforms are required in order to prevent, detect or respond to an attack of a similar nature to the Bondi attack”.
Virginia Bell has time to come to a different view as the royal commission progresses and, beyond legislative frameworks, may not give the Prime Minister such an easy exit. The interim report is a cleverly constructed document, understated in tone and precise in detail. It does not rush to judgment but sets the course for the rest of the inquiry.
The picture that emerges is of a counter-terrorism system where processes had overtaken urgency and practical outcomes.
This is, in other words, an intelligent piece of work. It asks the right questions and hints that the royal commission’s final report may be much more critical of government, police and public service performances in the lead-up to the Bondi Beach massacre on December 14, 2025.
Bell’s first chapter sets the “important context for assessing the effectiveness of relevant agencies” by drawing on public comments from ASIO boss Mike Burgess between 2022 and the December 2025 massacre.
Burgess’s annual public speeches have become important markers showing how ASIO lowered the national terrorism threat level to “possible” in November 2022 but then raised it to “probable” in August 2024.
Bell writes: “ASIO publicly and repeatedly drew attention to the heightened risk of a terrorist attack and to an environment of ‘disturbing escalation’ of antisemitic incidents.”
The report cites an ASIO statement of December 5, 2025 – just days before Bondi – saying: “Crowded places and events attracting large crowds are the most likely targets for a terrorist attack in Australia, with violent extremists using simple tactics and readily acquired weapons.”
The next chapter details NSW police planning and engagements with the Jewish community in the lead-up to the Hanukkah gathering at Bondi.
There were clear differences between police and Jewish community assessments about the level of risk.
The report says the Police Area Command operations inspector “asked the two Inspectors rostered on 14 December to attend the Chanukah by the Sea event, take a car crew or two and provide a high-visibility policing presence, noting that there was no need to stay the entire duration”.
There is an obvious mismatch between an underdone police response and growing public alarm about the risk of terrorism, “the normalisation of violent protest” and the explosion of antisemitic hostility. This will surely be a key focus of coming royal commission hearings.
Failures include that the national security committee of cabinet had lost “match fitness” to deal with a major terrorist attack by not participating in exercises to test the system.
To be clear: this is at the cabinet minister level. It appears that Labor in power thought there was no need to test its crisis management mettle. Did officials propose they do an exercise and get turned down?
Key policy documents including a counter-terrorism handbook and plan had not been updated since 2020, despite requirements for three-year reviews. This was not treated as a priority. What had once been a vital role of counter-terrorism co-ordinator had been burdened with other non-CT tasks. The review says the CT co-ordinator “assumes a leadership role during terrorism crises” so perhaps it should be a full-time role.
But it makes no sense to have a position that “co-ordinates” others at quiet times and then is supposed to decisively lead in crises. It was a policy job, not an operational position.
The blunders continue: a group known as the Australia- New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee was convened on the day of the attack but it does policy work – slowly – and has no role in crisis management.
Far more important in responding to incidents are joint counter-terrorism teams that bring state and federal agencies together. The interim report dryly notes that federal and state agencies could not offer “unqualified support for the present functioning of the JCTT NSW”. But these teams “have contributed centrally to at least 35 major (terrorism) disruptions since 2001”.
This hints at the deep-seated rivalry existing between state and federal police forces.
Some years ago I worked on crisis management for the NSW counter-terrorism minister. It was clear that the No. 1 unwritten rule of NSW police culture is “do not involve the feds”.
Hopefully the royal commission will address the cultural aspects of organisational behaviour that are far more important drivers of co-operation than wire diagrams and rule books.
The interim report also points to a significant technical challenge, which is how to connect scattered data points – for example, relating to gun ownership and overseas travel.
The report says part of the function of the National Criminal Intelligence System “is to identify ‘relationships’ between otherwise disparate datasets – around 2 billion relationships are currently identified”.
Perhaps this was addressed in a classified finding. The royal commission should ask if the national security system is failing to adopt the artificial intelligence technology needed to order and connect vast amounts of intelligence.
If that is demonstrated it may be the result of inadequate resourcing and frankly a lack of policy imagination. The royal commission should consider the possibility that Australia’s counter-terrorism management needs less “co-ordination” and more centrally driven policy creation. We have seen very little of that over many years.
The interim review correctly identifies that many problems in counter-terrorism come from a lack of money. Intelligence agency funding has grown significantly between 2020 and 2025 but “the proportion of funding allocated to counter-terrorism significantly declined” during that time.
Albanese dismissed that concern at his press conference: “The report has a clear table in it that goes to the increased funding that is there for all of the national security agencies.”
Looking at police resourcing, the interim report finds that funding for “counter-terrorism and special tactics” is only 2 per cent of the NSW Police budget in 2025. Funding for the same group was 1.9 per cent in the more benign environment of 2010.
At his press conference, Albanese said the interim report showed “no urgent changes are required to keep Australians safe”. That reading sits uneasily with the detail in the report.
There is more than enough in Bell’s interim report to suggest that she may be positioning to produce a sweeping indictment of government inattention on counter-terrorism and the growth of antisemitism.
If that happens it is unavoidable that attention will focus back on Albanese and his national security team because it is government that sets the priority for bureaucratic action.
The interim report paints a picture of bureaucratic drift and a failure to address the details of how agencies can share information, co-operate closely and overcome technical problems.
If those things aren’t happening, it suggests counter-terrorism has not been treated as a priority. This is not for the want of ASIO and the Australian Federal Police regularly pointing out the growing risk in very direct terms. Their warnings were not matched with visible policy urgency.
If this is the direction that the royal commission is heading towards, then an alert and engaged Prime Minister should want to get ahead of the challenge by appointing an individual to rapidly implement Bell’s 14 recommendations.
The need is for less “co-ordination”, which often becomes a public service vehicle for slowly developed, steady-as-you-go, consensus outcomes. What is needed is some energy and policy imagination – otherwise known as leadership. Co-ordination manages inputs; leadership sets direction and priorities.
A new counter-terrorism leader should be able to equip the Prime Minister with a more energised plan, looking at new technology and setting spending priorities. More funding will be needed, but that is a reality of having to deal with rapidly changing domestic security threats.
A new CT lead should recommend shutting down some of the old “co-ordination” mechanisms that have calcified. This includes the CT co-ordinator, now located in Home Affairs.
Bell wisely recognises that the Prime Minister’s department has “convening power” in a way that the Department of Home Affairs does not.
Albanese would be well advised to bring counter-terrorism policy back under the control of his own department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. This is where the CT lead should be located because the Prime Minister will also be called on to head national responses to major terror incidents.
The Prime Minister’s lack of engagement in dealing with counter-terrorism and antisemitism has been evident since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and his initial reluctance to establish the royal commission last December.
The interim report suggests the government is underestimating the likelihood of a far more critical final assessment. The drift in counter-terrorism and the rise of antisemitism happened on the Prime Minister’s watch. It remains within his hands to improve the government’s performance in both areas.
