Years of ADF underfunding has left Australia not only unwilling – but unable – to offer the US significant military assistance in the event of a protracted war in Iran, writes Peter Jennings.
Australia has only limited options to support the United States in a war against Iran and the Albanese government shows little appetite to use even those.
This is because the ADF has been starved of operational funding in recent years.
There have been fewer ship days at sea, fewer army deployments and fewer aircraft flying hours because the government is squeezing the current ADF to pay for ships and submarines we won’t see until the 2030s.
The deployment of the E7 Wedgetail aircraft to provide airborne surveillance over the United Arab Emirates is the most immediately available ADF capability.
The Wedgetail has already proven its value in overseas deployments, including a 2025 mission to Europe supporting Ukraine.
Australia has only limited options to support the United States in a war against Iran and the Albanese government shows little appetite to use even those.
This is because the ADF has been starved of operational funding in recent years.
There have been fewer ship days at sea, fewer army deployments and fewer aircraft flying hours because the government is squeezing the current ADF to pay for ships and submarines we won’t see until the 2030s.
The deployment of the E7 Wedgetail aircraft to provide airborne surveillance over the United Arab Emirates is the most immediately available ADF capability.
The Wedgetail has already proven its value in overseas deployments, including a 2025 mission to Europe supporting Ukraine.
We don’t know the precise type or number of these missiles, but the government bought 400 for more than $1 billion in April 2025.
Anthony Albanese seems to have no appetite for doing more to respond to President Trump’s request for military assistance.
But expect the US pressure to continue because it’s probable their military operation will last for months.
The most likely option for a larger ADF contribution would be to send one of the Navy’s three Hobart class air warfare destroyers.
Each has a 48-cell vertical launch system capable of firing a range of missiles including the SM-6, which is an anti-missile weapon and Tomahawk cruise missiles.
The AWDs have the capability to protect themselves against attack in a high threat environment like the Strait of Hormuz, and they know how to integrate with the US Navy.
Unfortunately, it’s not clear that any one of our three AWDs is in a position to deploy to the Persian Gulf.
Much like their British counterpart, the Royal Australian Navy is in crisis of readiness, lacking crews and days at sea.
Other military capabilities that could be deployed, but most probably won’t, include the Air Force’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, air-to-air refuelling aircraft and a range of intelligence gathering aircraft.
If it becomes a long-term American task to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, Australia has very limited capabilities to assist with hunting for sea mines.
Of our beleaguered Army capabilities, only the Special Forces would likely be ready for short notice deployment into intense combat operations.
All deployments come with serious risk, and the Albanese government has no appetite for that.
Heading into their fifth year of government Albanese and his national security ministers have never shown themselves to be serious about defence.
As a result, the ADF is significantly less ready for a large-scale overseas deployment than has been the case since our forces were in East Timor 25 years ago.
We are dealing with the consequences of decades of underinvestment in defence.
Coalition and Labor governments have since 2020 been warning of a significant deterioration in our strategic outlook but resolutely refusing to do anything to strengthen the current day capabilities of the ADF.
If Washington expects meaningful Australian support in a prolonged conflict with Iran, it will find that Canberra has little to offer beyond small-scale contributions.
This is the result of policy choices weakening the current ADF in favour of investing in a mythical future force that will not arrive for years.
The hard strategic reality is that you fight with the force you have, not the force you dream about.
