Not Clean, Not Green

The dirty secrets of so-called ‘clean’ energy have been laid bare in a new book that should be mandatory reading, writes IPA Research Fellow Lachlan Clark.

Achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, if not earlier, has become the most prominent socio-economic and political objective of the 21st century. The drive towards achieving this target is predicated on the notion that the greenhouse gas emissions produced by our industrial activities over the past two centuries, especially carbon dioxide, will have a catastrophic effect on the planet. According to this narrative, to ensure we avoid the impending cataclysm, we must reduce our emissions by shifting away from ‘dirty’ sources of energy, such as coal, oil, and gas, and move towards supposedly ‘clean’ or ‘green’ sources of energy such as wind and solar.

In the West, we have all been led to believe wind and solar are clean and green technologies, however they are worse for the environment than the technologies which they replace. By analysing the entire life cycle and supply chain of these new technologies—from how the raw materials are mined and processed, to manufacturing and installation, and then ultimately to disposal—it becomes clear the climate-industrial complex has cunningly duped a large part of society.

The key message of The Rare Metals War: the dark side of clean energy and digital technologies is that ‘net zero’ may be the biggest greenwashing operation in history.

In this illuminating book, Guillaume Pitron brings to light an untold story of the energy and digital transformation, revealing the technologies which underpin this transformation are not nearly as pristine as they have been made out to be. Drawing on six years of research across multiple countries, The Rare Metals War takes the reader on a journey around the entire globe, exploring some of the environmental destruction wreaked by the so-called clean energy supply chain.

One part of the book takes you on a journey to the tropical foothills of the Nankang mountains in the Chinese province of Jiangxi—far off the beaten track, to what is arguably the largest rare metals mining region on the planet. Locals describe working conditions there simply as “hell’’. Another transports you 2,000km north, to the city of Baotou, the capital of the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia and the closest major population centre to the Baogang mines: the largest rare earth production site on the planet. While in Baotou, Pitron visited the dystopian setting of the Weikuang Dam: an artificial lake into which metallic intestines disgorge constant streams of black liquid from nearby refineries. As Pitron puts it:

I was looking at 10 square kilometres of toxic effluent, which occasionally flows in the Yellow River. This is also the beating heart of the energy and digital transition. I was left speechless during the hour I spent observing this immense, disintegrating lunar landscape.

NEITHER CLEAN NOR GREEN

The idea that wind, solar, and related technologies may actually be worse for the environment than conventional hydrocarbons at first may seem implausible. After all, wind and sunlight are part of the natural world. But creating the products that transform them into useable energy requires the extraction and processing of large amounts of raw minerals, which is extremely polluting and energy intensive. To put it simply, ‘clean energy’ technologies are actually very dirty since they depend on the use of raw minerals, and a mine-to-product process that is the antithesis of ‘clean’ and ‘green’.

Pitron further notes:

The technologies … depend on resources (rare earth metals and tantalus) that release radiation when mined. While rare metals are not radioactive in themselves, the process of separating them from other radioactive minerals – such as thorium and uranium – to which they are naturally associated produces radiation in amounts that cannot be overlooked.

Pitron also challenges the notion that renewable (solar and wind) projects are carbon-free and indeed genuinely renewable, noting “on account of their silicon content, producing just one [solar] panel generates as much as 70kg of carbon dioxide”. Moreover, wind and solar infrastructure ultimately require more raw materials to be mined than older technologies, and the lifespan of the viable reserves of some of the principal metals needed for the energy transition—such as lithium, graphite, cobalt, and nickel—is short. So aside from being dirty and harmful to the environment, wind and solar are anything but renewable.

ALL ROADS LEAD TO BEIJING

In the years to come, demand for base and rare minerals to support the world’s energy transition is expected to increase exponentially. The International Energy Agency estimates that by 2040, under a sustainable development scenario (which assumes net zero is achieved), there will be a 42-fold increase in the demand for lithium, a 25-fold increase in the demand for graphite, a 21-fold increase in the demand for cobalt, a 19-fold increase in the demand for nickel, an eight-fold increase in the demand for manganese, a seven-fold increase in the demand for rare earths, and a three-fold increase in the demand for copper.

Wind and solar are anything but renewable.

This is a matter of particular concern for Australia and the West because the supply chain of these commodities is undisputedly dominated by just one country: China. China is by far the world’s largest metals refining hub, producing the overwhelming majority of the refined metals needed for the net zero energy transition. In terms of refined production, in 2022 China accounted for all the world’s graphite production, 90 per cent of the world’s rare earth production, 74 per cent of the world’s cobalt production, and 65 per cent of the world’s lithium production.

China’s stranglehold on the production of these key commodities was not achieved overnight or by chance. Rather, it is the product of a long, sophisticated, and shrewd master plan. The Rare Metals War exposes the plan, explores the fascinating history of the metals processing industry, and details how, decades ago, metals production shifted from the West to the East.

Pitron describes how a growing China, thirsty for further economic growth in the early 2000s, saw—in Western societies’ move towards a zero environmental risk approach to mining—an opportunity for market dominance.

We have knowingly and patiently created a system that allows us to move our ‘filth’ as far away as possible, and the Chinese – far

from pinching their noses – have welcomed the initiative with open arms.

The West, in its misguided pursuit of a greener and more environmentally friendly world, has transferred—and exacerbated—the problem of pollution to less affluent parts of the world rather than managing it domestically. The then developing world was willing to endure environmental deterioration for the sake of economic growth and, significantly, geopolitical advantage.

As a result, those in the West who have been vehemently demanding the world transition to a ‘green economy’ are simply virtue signalling to no real end.

NET LOSS FOR AUSTRALIA

As history demonstrates, the control of a crucial resource can often be weaponised by those with exclusive possession. Just as oil has been used as an economic lever over the last two centuries, should the push for renewables remain a global focus, the resources needed to construct infrastructure for the renewable transition will increasingly be a geopolitical lever for China. China’s late paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, said: “The Middle East has its oil, China has its rare earths”.

In 2010, China banned the export of neodymium to Japan on the back of a territorial dispute. Neodymium is a rare metal needed to make wind turbines and electric vehicles. This resulted in a supply shock which led to a 30-fold increase in the price of the commodity. Last year, China decided to restrict the export of the rare earth elements gallium and germanium: rare metals used in the production of semiconductors, military equipment, and solar panels. This decision is understood to be a response to the United States’ decision in October 2023 to limit exports of semiconductors to China.

Fundamentally, for Australia—and for the West more broadly—what this all means is that continuing to pursue the net zero agenda will make us more dependent on China. Forthcoming research by the Institute of Public Affairs analyses global export markets for critical minerals, solar products, wind products, and other goods involved in the renewable energy transition. It finds that in 2022, China made US$479 billion from exporting these so-called ‘green products’.

Australia has the most to lose from the net zero economy.

This dwarfs every other nation and represents more than 22 per cent of the entire global trade. By contrast, Australia made only US$26 billion, meaning China earned over 18 times more than Australia in this market.

Of even greater concern, out of all the nations surveyed, Australia has the most to lose from the net zero economy. In 2022, Australia made $176 billion from exporting coal and gas—more than any other nation. Clearly, the pursuit of the net zero transition and a reliance on renewables is not in Australia’s best economic interest.

The Rare Metals War should be mandatory reading for all members of parliament, and for those in charge of Australia’s energy policy, our trade relations, national security, environmental policy, and our economic prospects. It might help awaken those currently sleepwalking into an economic and national security disaster.